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I thank Professor C. Eme for her encouraging roles
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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the NATO war on Serbia and its implications beyond the shores and territorial boundary of Serbia. Moved by what it described as gross violation of human rights, and the images of burning homes resulting from the raging conflict in Kosovo in 1999, NATO intervened into the situation by declaring war against the sovereign state of Serbia in defense of the Albanians in Kosovo. The war, like wars generally, produced effects, especially on Serbia. Besides the implications of this war on Serbia, it had far reaching consequences on the territories and countries beyond Serbia. It is to these extra-Serbian consequences of the NATO’s war that this paper devotes its attention. Using exclusively the secondary method of data gathering, the paper finds that NATO’s military attack against Serbia inter alia, unleashed a tidal wave of refugees that placed both economic and political pressure on the neighbouring countries, set a wrong and dangerous international precedent, damaged United States’ relationship with both China and Russia and made all Serbia’s neighbours register trade declines through war-induced trade disruptions.

INTRODUCTION

The Kosovo crisis which seed was sown by the age-long history of ethnic struggle within the former Yugoslavia state, but got radicalized by the agreements in the Dayton Accord and the killing of forty-five ethnic Albanians in 1999, was one among the many conflicts that characterize the post-Cold War world. Besides the earlier skirmishes that have assailed the history line of the Balkan region and especially the former state of Yugoslavia, where Kosovo was located, Kosovo in the wake of the year 1999 became disquieted by a spate of violence that was unprecedented in the annals of inter-ethnic strife. The crisis generated flagrant violations of international human law that shocked the conscience of mankind. As the Kosovo conflict surged, the need to halt the internecine killings and carnage necessitated a moral imperative for an armed intervention. Compelled by the continued bloodbath in Kosovo, NATO intervened. By doing this, NATO, an originally alliance and military regional body, transformed itself into the newly assigned roles of peacekeeping. The key argument presented by NATO was that the Serbian government under President Milosevic had caused a humanitarian emergency in Kosovo, which was interpreted as a threat to international peace. The government of Serbia was accused of indulging in genocidal acts against the ethnic Albanian population of the province. Following this, NATO in 1992, launched an attack against Serbia in defense of Kosovo, however, without an authorization by the United Nations Security Council. Through its Operation Allied Force, NATO bombed Serbia for 78 sustained days between 24 March and 10 June 1999. In the 11-week bombardment, 12,000 bombing missions took place, in which more than 900 aircraft were involved. More than 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched and 20,000 smart and 5000
conventional bombs were dropped (Daya, 2000). Unarguably, wars are not without affects. Inspite of its seemingly utilities as the realists would argue, war is an enigma. It is an evil wind that blows nobody any good. Such was the case in Serbia which suffered NATO’s sustained military attacks in a war declared against her by the later in defense of the Albanians in Kosovo. Besides the obvious damaging consequences of this war on Serbia, it equally produced resultant implications on societies and on issues beyond the territorial boundary of Serbia. It is to these extra-Serbian consequences of the NATO’s war that this paper devotes its attention.

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT, A PRECURSOR OF NATO’S ATTACK ON SERBIA

Kosovo, formerly an autonomous province in the defunct Yugoslavia, has long been a fiercely contested borderland between Serbia and Albania (Bideleux and Jefferies 2007). Before the conflict that wretched the area in 1999, the province of Kosovo was inhabited by the Serbs and Albanians. The conflict in Kosovo was typified by ethnic and political tension between the Serbian government and the Albania-dominated Kosovo which sought independence from Serbia. The seeds of the crisis were not unconnected to the history of the country and the contested claims of indigenship and ownership of Kosovo. The question that begged for answer over the years was ‘who owns Kosovo?. While the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo who comprise the vast majority of the population in Kosovo believe that their nation is the oldest in the Balkans, the Serbs believed the contrary. The Kosovo Albanians see themselves as directly descending from the ancient Dardanians, a branch of the Illyrian people who had allegedly inhabited most of the western Balkans, including Kosovo, for many centuries before the arrival of the Serbs on the scene in the later (12th) century (Bideleux and Jefferies 2007). This has encouraged the Albanians to assert that their ethnic group rightly has prior claim to several Serb inhabited areas of the western Balkans, especially Kosovo, and regard the Serb inhabitants of Kosovo as recent military usurpers of the ethnic Albanian homeland (Enuka 2015). The Serbian inhabitants of Kosovo refute the Albanians’ claim that the Albanians are the descendants of Illyrians. The Serbs maintain that even if the link between the Illyrians and Albanians is true, it does not count since every claim of territorial rights that relies on the ethnic map of pre-migration Europe is simply impossible, for in that period there were no states or nations as we know them today (Judah 1999). The Serbs’ claim of right to Kosovo was based on the fact that they (the Serbs) migrated to the region before the Albanians, founded a great medieval empire etc. The Serbs’ argument of historical right over Kosovo is one of first occupancy: we were first (Daskalovski 2003). These opposing perceptions of Kosovo and claims of its ownership also informed the interpretations of subsequent political and legal developments in the area. Legally, the Serbs argue that Kosovo was an internal affair of Serbia and that Kosovo Albanians can be granted some sort of autonomy, but certainly not independence. One clear point is that the particularized nationalistic claims cannot be relied on, for they are conflicting and difficult to adjudicate. None of the narratives leaves space for the existence of the other. The big problem that needed to be overcome was how to reconcile the two diametrically opposing interpretations of historical and legal developments in Kosovo. The failure to achieve a harmonization of the two mythological accounts exacerbated the hotly contested indigeneity question, leading Kosovo and its inhabitants into a catastrophic war that claimed several hundreds of lives.

Added to the above confusing situation, the President Milosevic’s misrule of Serbia (or defunct Yugoslavia) was contributory in the Kosovo conflict that necessitated NATO’s bombing of
Serbia in defense of Kosovo. From the time of his rise to power, Milosevic emerged as an advocate for the rights of ethnic Serbs. Through his populist mobilization of Serbian ethnic consciousness at mass rallies, sometimes referred to as ‘street democracy’ Milosevic challenged the previous government’s style of managing the national question. Under the President before Milosevic (Tito), the country adopted a constitution that provided for an eight member collective presidency with one representative from each of the six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro, and two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina (Kirkpatrick 2007). But on his assumption of office, President Milosevic reversed this order, officially revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo within the country, and began his policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This action exacerbated the already volatile situation in Kosovo and further set Serbia and Kosovo on course towards conflict.

Owing to the perceived political and other injustices against them by the Milosevic government, the height of which was the revocation of the autonomy status of Kosovo, and being influenced by the new radical wave of democracy across the then Yugoslavia leading to the independence of Bosnia, Slovenia, Croatia etc, the Albanians of Kosovo responded with an organized agitation, claiming among other things, the total independence of Kosovo from Serbia. Having formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), attacks against Serb military and police installations in Kosovo began, prompting retaliatory actions by the government of Milosevic in Belgrade, Serbia. These attacks and responses to them began a tit-for-tat cycle of escalating violence in the Kosovo province. By 1998, armed violence has become a norm in Kosovo. The resultant effect of these were bloodbaths, and deluge of displacement of especially the Kosovo Albanians.

NATO’s WAR ON SERBIA
Responding to images of burning homes and frightened villages on the nightly news, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1199 on September 23, which demanded that Milosevic should “cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population” and threatened to act if Milosevic did not obey (Kirkpatrick 2007). NATO made similar demands the next day, and following reports of Serb massacres, US Secretary of Defense threatened Milosevic with air strikes (Kegley and Raymond 2003). Arising from these threats, the crisis in Kosovo became temporarily diffused, especially when Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke was able to broker a cease-fire agreement. The European mediators of the conflict, the Contact Group, summoned the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians to attend peace talks in Rambouillet, a small town located about thirty miles from Paris. The Peace proposal offered to the delegates at Rambouillet called for the disarmament of the KLA, the withdrawal of Belgrade’s military units from Kosovo, deployment of a NATO-led peace keeping force, restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy, and a referendum in three years on the regions political future (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000). Much to the surprise of the negotiators, the negotiation was at an impasse. The Serbs remained intransigent and rejected the peace proposal. In a final effort to secure the Serbs acceptance to the proposal and a cease-fire, Richard Holbrooke, United States’ envoy, flew to Belgrade to meet President Slobadan Milosevic. Holbrooke told the Serbian leader that unless he accepted the proposed Rambouillet agreement, NATO would bomb his country (Kegeley and Raymond 2003). Holbrooke in a firm, deliberate tone promised Milosevic that the attack on his country would be “swift, severe, and sustained” (Judah 2000: 227). True to Holbrooke’s promise, NATO’s attack against Serbia began on March 24, 1999. The goals of NATO’s Operation Allied Force, which executed the war campaign were to disrupt, degrade and ultimately destroy the
Serbian Army, to frustrate its power to wage war in the future; to stop the use of terror against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo; and to deter ethnic cleansing campaign (Kegley and Raymond 2003, Enuka 2015).

By March 29, 1999 it had become obvious that Serbia was under a serious and determined military attack by NATO. Hail of explosives on Belgrade, the capital city of Serbia, by NATO’s Operation Allied Force was fully commenced. The portfolio of targets included oil refineries, radio and television broadcasting facilities, and the national power grid. NATO knocked out 70 percent of Serbia’s electricity production capacity, and 80 percent of its oil refinery capacity (Kirkpatrick 2007). Once the grid went down, Milosevic’s support in Serbia began to erode as the civilian population became increasingly demoralized. With the crumbling of the people’s morale, anti-war demonstrations and protests replaced pro-war rock concerts throughout Serbia. In different towns of the country, protesters reportedly shouted “The dead do not need Kosovo!” (Enuka 2015: 102). It was obvious that with the unpopularity of the war at home, and the inability of the Serb government to control its military forces, that Milosevic would capitulate. This possibility was heightened by NATO’s threat of broadening its campaign.

Following stream of negotiations to mediate an agreement, President Marti Ahtisaari of Finland, and Russian envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, presented a document based on the G-8 principles to Milosevic, who subsequently accepted. Consequent upon this, NATO ended its bombing of Serbia on June 10, 1999 with the United Nations Security Council adopting the Resolution 1244, which set forth a plan that gave the United Nations responsibilities in Kosovo: policing the province, overseeing human rights abuses, organizing elections, and overseeing the return of refugees etc. Throughout the war, NATO flew more than thirty seven thousand (37,000) sorties against Serbia, and did not suffer a single combatant fatality. The United States flew more than sixty percent of the total, and was responsible for the electronic warfare missions and over ninety five percent of the cruise missiles that were fired.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR BEYOND SERBIA
Wars are not without affects. This holds true especially on the societies that participate in them. Such was the case in Serbia which suffered NATO’s sustained military attacks in a war declared against her by the later in defense of the Albanians in Kosovo. But besides the obvious damaging consequences of this war on Serbia, the NATO war with Serbia produced resultant implications on societies and on issues beyond the territorial boundary of Serbia. To these extra-Serbian consequences of the NATO-Serbia war, we will now turn:

Tidal Wave of Refugees The war unleashed un-numbered refugees who were evicted from Kosovo. The Serb strategy exacerbated the situation. Code-named Operation Horseshoe, the plan called for Serbian troops to encircle the Kosovo Albanians in a U-shaped formation, and then drive them out of the province of Kosovo. The result was refugees. The Albanians constituted over 800,000 of the refugees (Kegley and Raymond 2003). This deluge of refugees was a threat to societies outside of Serbia. The great number of these men, women and children evicted from their Kosovo homeland overwhelmed the neighbouring states of Serbia which lacked the infrastructure to care for such a human tidal wave. As the crowded refugee camps began filling the borderland of neighbouring states, it placed political pressure on especially Macedonia, and threatened to destabilize the entire region.
**Damaging Economic Consequences to Neighbouring Countries:** Aside the loss of huge amount of money (4.2 billion USD) associated with Bosnia’s and Macedonia’s efforts to manage the flood of refugees from Kosovo, bulk of economic losses as a result of the war resulted from the severing of transportation routes along the Danube River, and over land through Serbia (Dempsey 2000). The Serbian market was badly hit by trade and other economic related sanctions placed on Serbia during the war. As a consequence of these trade disruptions, nearly all of Serbia’s neighbours registered export declines in 1999 (Carpenter 2000). Closure of border with Serbia resulted in dramatic loss in Macedonia’s export market, since Macedonia’s direct trade and transit trade through Serbia represented roughly 70 percent of Macedonia’s export. As a result, Macedonia’s 1999 incremental balance of payments gap rose from 38 to 337 million US Dollars or 9.5 percent of the GDP (Carpenter 2000). The war forced Macedonian factories that do business with Serbia to stop or curtail production. A Macedonian factory that produced parts for the Zastava’s car company in Serbia had to lay off 6,000 workers because Zastava’s factory was destroyed by NATO bombs (Cook 1999).

The wreckage of six bridges that NATO bombs brought on the Danube Bridge in Serbia, paralyzing shipping traffic along the 1,750-mile waterway that links Germany to the Black Sea, had the greatest impact on Bulgaria’s economy. Bulgarian businesses, which moved 65 percent of their exports along the Danube before the war, were forced to spend 8 million US dollars in April alone to reload their cargo onto trucks and railroad cars (Bennett 2009). It was reported that the country was losing 1.5 million US dollars a day when NATO’s bombing rendered the Danube impassable (Whittle 1999). Overall, Bulgarian exports dove 24 percent in the first quarter of 1999, according to a post war assessment made by Bulgaria’s National Statistics Institute, and according to Bulgaria’s trade minister, the Bulgarian trade economy lost 70.7 million US dollars as a result of the war: 30.8 million US dollars in transport, 22.7 million dollars in industry, 9.1 million in agriculture, and 8.1 million in other sectors (Dempsey 2000). One company that really felt the pinch was the Bulgarian logistics company, Econt Trans. It normally arranges river transport for 100,000 tons of iron ore, 20,000 tons of steel products, and 10,000 tons of chemicals from Bulgarian ports to customers in the West each year. With the bombing of Danube, it became difficult to arrange alternative transport for such goods in couple of days. Blocking the Danube had corresponding effect on the employment situation in Bulgaria. The state-owned shipping company, for example, had to lay off about a thousand workers.

When the Danube was closed by the wreckage of NATO’s bombing, 126 Romanian barges and 18 foreign barges destined for Romania, carrying 60,000 tons of merchandise were suddenly stranded (Whittle1999). The Romanian Association of River Ship-owners and Harbour Operators, which represent 92 percent of Romania’s shipping capacity, estimated that 90 million US dollars was lost during NATO’s 11-week bombing: shipping companies lost 63.9 million US dollars, port operators lost 11.9 million, brokers lost 4.9 million, harbour and waterway utilities lost 4.0 million, and shipbuilders lost 1.3 million (Dempsey 2000). Though the economic situation in Romania had been deteriorating for some years before the NATO war, but the air strike by NATO made it worse. Romania’s GDP shrank by 7.3 percent (Economist 1999). According to government estimates, NATO’s air war cost Romania more than half a billion dollars in lost to trade and higher transportation costs. Romania’s currency also lost half its value in 1999, and foreign direct investment dropped when the war started.
**Dangerous International Precedent:** The NATO war against Serbia in defense of Kosovo has been praised by its supporters because it was not a war for territory but a war to defend the fundamental rights of people who faced persecution. Therefore, the normal rules that prohibit attacks against a foreign country did not apply. When a government violates the rights of its citizens the way the Milosevic regime violated the rights of the Albanians, the international community has a right, and even an obligation to intervene with military force (Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003). Under such circumstance, sovereignty, it is alleged, is no longer sacrosanct. When fundamental human rights are being violated, sovereignty must yield. Nevertheless, by acting on their own, and by justifying their unilateral action as both legitimate and necessary in the name of protecting beleaguered ethnic minority, NATO’s leaders risked legitimizing a process that in the past had led to tragedy. NATO leaders may have been genuinely concerned by Milosevic’s treatment of the Albanians in Kosovo, especially after the massacre in Racak in early 1999, but the process by which the decision for military intervention was reached failed to have a recognized legitimacy.

NATO’s justification for its military intervention in Kosovo is remarkably similar to Hitler’s justification for military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Hitler’s claims against Czechoslovakia were based on alleged violations of the fundamental rights of the Sudeten Germans. His accusations of the mistreatment of the ethnic Germans were purposely exaggerated and distorted to inflame public opinion. He invoked the specter of ethnic cleansing to justify his ultimatum.

*We see the appalling figures: on one day 10,000 fugitives, on the next 20,000, a day later, already 37,000. Whole stretches of a country were depopulated, villages are burned down, attempts are made to smoke out the Germans with hand-grenades and gas* (Carpeneter 2000).

Hitler’s concern for the Sudeten Germans was manufactured. The Sudeten territory was just a stepping stone to seizing Czechoslovakia and ultimately a greater space in Europe. The US Senate Republican Policy Committee (1998) pointed out that the planning to attack Serbia had been made several months before the NATO bombing. All that was lacking, but seriously needed was a suitable pretext (Jatras 2000).

NATO bombing of Serbia appeared to have strengthened suspicions about NATO’s intentions in the post-Cold War world. The most offensive part was the overstepping of the United Nations Security Council, by which NATO brought itself to something parallel to or above the world body. Obviously, Russia, India, Ukraine and other Asian countries, and a silent majority of the world community opposed this anarchy by a few powerful countries that were bent on undermining the authority of the United Nations (Nisar 1999). The popular understanding was that the Western powers, which have the latest military technology on earth, want to control and replace the United Nations (Kober 2000). Sid-Ahmed (1999) acknowledged that “Kosovo has witnessed unimaginable atrocities”, but NATO “is not empowered to carry out punitive raids against a sovereign state without the authorization of the United Nations, the only universally recognized and genuinely global organization backed by international law.” The mounting enthusiasm for nuclear weapons which is currently disturbing the peace of the world today is one of the most disturbing consequences of NATO’s military actions against Serbia. NATO’s air war over Kosovo complicated efforts to persuade nations to forgo nuclear weapons. In a US-North
Korean meeting, the North Korean leaders replied, “Why should North Korea give up those weapons? If it did, the United States might start complaining about human rights in North Korea and bomb it into oblivion like Serbia” (Kober 2000: 115). With the Serbian instance, countries began feeling that NATO and other American allies reserve the right to unilaterally initiate military action, and that they should therefore, seek to protect themselves, which would be by reliance on nuclear weapons. As the bombing of Serbia commenced, the Ukraine parliament voted 231-46 to encourage the government reconsider the country’s nonnuclear status, claiming that NATO’s attack amounted to aggression against a sovereign state. The then Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee accused NATO of indulging in naked aggression against Serbia, and that in doing that, that NATO had disregarded the United Nations completely. Vajpayee’s decision was similar to that of Ukraine: if NATO is the threat, the solution must rest with a nuclear deterrent (Carpenter 2000).

**Damage to Relations with Russia and China:** One of the most troubling consequences of the NATO war against Serbia was the marked deterioration of relations between the United States and two major powers in the international system, Russia and the Peoples Republic of China. Both countries vehemently opposed NATO’s decision to use force against Serbia and saw it as unnecessary and counterproductive. They were especially upset at NATO bypassed the United Nations Security Council. From the standpoint of officials in Moscow and Beijing, that action by NATO was an extremely worrisome precedent. Possession of veto power as permanent members of the Security Council would have little relevance if the United States and its allies could simply ignore the Security Council’s prerogative to approve or reject proposals to use coercive measures and act on their own. To both Russia and China, NATO’s unauthorized intervention in the Serbian internal conflict was politically marginalizing to them.

In addition to their shared concern, each of the countries had its own reasons for opposing the substance of NATO’s policy. Russia has significant economic, cultural, and religious links to the Serbs that go back to more than a century. The Russian people did not welcome the sight of NATO bombs falling on fellow Slavs and Eastern Orthodox coreligionists (Tedd 2000). Moscow was also worried about the broader implications of the Kosovo conflict. There are several ethnically based secessionist movements in the far-flung Russian federation, and although the West did not interfere when Russian forces attempted to squelch one of those movements in Chechnya, but if NATO’s intervention in Kosovo went unchallenged, there would be less certainty of a similar hands-off attitude should another crisis erupt elsewhere in the federation.

Given China’s problems with restless ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang, Beijing likewise had reason to be apprehensive about the Kosovo precedent. Anything that so obviously diluted the sanctity of national sovereignty and made it clear that some members of the international community thought they had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another country seemed to menace important Chinese domestic interests. In addition, Beijing saw the intervention in Kosovo as another piece of evidence that the United States was determined to be the global hegemon and run roughshod over any country that dared defy its wishes. According to that reasoning, NATO and America’s bilateral alliances, such as those with South Korea and Japan, were institutional mechanisms for implementing Washington’s global imperial policy (Enuka 2011).
Moscow and Beijing were worried about the direction of U.S. and NATO policy even before the alliance began to move against Serbia. But the demands made on Belgrade, and especially at the onset of the bombing campaign, greatly intensified their suspicions and the resulting anger. Moscow’s reaction to NATO’s military coercion of Serbia was even more strident than its response to the alliance’s previous political inroads on Russia’s western and southern flanks through, respectively, the expansion of NATO’s membership and Washington’s joint military exercises with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other former Soviet republics (Babara and Carpenter 1998). Russia’s more intense reaction to the intervention in the Balkans is not surprising. The bombing campaign discredited the West’s soothing assurances that Russia had nothing to fear from NATO’s enlargement because NATO was a purely defensive alliance. Whatever else one might conclude about the intervention in the Balkans, it showed unequivocally that NATO is now a proactive, offensive military association. Kremlin responded to the attack on Serbia by recalling Russian military officers from their liaison roles at NATO headquarters in Brussels and expelling their NATO counterparts from Moscow. Kremlin leaders denounced the assault on Serbia with the kind of shrill rhetoric not heard since the worst days of the Cold War. The harsh response was not confined to the political elite. Large and sometimes violent anti-NATO demonstrations erupted in Moscow and other cities. Pro-democratic Russian political leaders warned that the war had caused an unprecedented degree of genuine anti-Western, especially anti-American sentiment among the Russian people. Those leaders fear that NATO’s actions may produce another surge of domestic support for communist and ultranationalist factions, leading to their greater domination of the Duma.

The continuing contemptuous dismissal of Russia as a European great power with significant Balkan interests became apparent at the end of the fighting when NATO leaders refused to give Russia a separate peacekeeping zone in Kosovo, despite the considerable service Moscow had performed in orchestrating a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The egregious nature of the snub was underscored by the fact that even Italy, barely a second-tier European power—was assigned a zone. Predictably, Russian political and military leaders reacted furiously to such treatment. One Russian liberal intellectual, Pikayev, probably summarized the attitude of many of his compatriots when he accused the West of treating Russia like Pampers: “you use us for your dirty work and then throw us away” (Carpenter 2000).

NATO’s very public disdain for Russian sensibilities led to the stunning entry of Russian troops into Kosovo and their seizure of the Pristina airport before NATO troops could arrive. The world was then entertained with television images of British and Russian troops facing off at the airport and Russian armored personnel carriers racing up and down the runway to drown out the speech of British general Sir Michael Jackson, commander of the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. It was not exactly a symbol of NATO-Russian harmony and cooperation.

The Kosovo intervention also intensified China’s suspicions about America’s global intentions, and caused US-China relations to decline to their lowest point since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. The principal catalyst for that deterioration was the U.S-led NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 7, 1999. Although President Clinton and other officials immediately apologized, but there were outside chances that the attack was not accidental (Enuka 2015). Some openly charged that the attack was deliberate, perpetuated by elements within the U.S military and foreign policy bureaucracy that view China as an enemy
and wanted to destroy relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (Forney 1999). Beijing feared that an increasingly assertive U.S-led network of alliances might use the Bosnia and Kosovo precedents to intervene in similar problems of direct interests to China. In particular, Chinese officials felt that NATO’s Balkan policy was the harbinger of a global humanitarian interventionist doctrine that someday might be applied to such problems that they consider strictly internal (South China Morning Post, 1999). Consequently, an upsurge in anti-U.S sentiment became inevitable, as a tangible sign of Beijing’s displeasure. China promptly suspended high level military contacts and human rights dialogues and banned U.S military aircraft from landing and U.S warships from docking in Hong Kong (Perlez 1999). What occurred in the days following the bombing went far beyond a normal negative reaction. Mobs of Chinese young people attacked American businesses and other targets in Shanghai, Beijing, and other cities. Some participants in the mob violence directed a barrage of rocks, bottles, and firebombs at the U.S embassy and ambassador’s residence in Beijing. It was so severe that the Ambassador, James Sasser dared not leave the residence for three days.

Although it is difficult to measure precisely the extent of the damage that the Kosovo war and especially the bombing of the Chinese embassy inflicted on United States-China relations, but there is little doubt that the damage is considerable.

**Impetus for Counter Hegemonic Coalition:** One sure affect produced by the NATO’s military attack on Serbia was that it created impetus for counter hegemonic coalition. The United States and NATO were perhaps strangely oblivious to the reality that, in most parts of the world, the air strikes on Serbia were viewed, not as the prosecution of a just war to prevent genocide, but as a brutal attack on a small nation that was incapable of striking back. That pervasive attitude provided the raw material for constructing a counter hegemonic coalition. Moscow and Beijing began to speak openly of a strategic partnership, and China had become Russia’s largest arms customer, something that would have been unthinkable a few years ago, given the long standing tensions between the two giants (Bernstein and Munro 1999). More troubling was the report that Russia officials had approached their counterparts in Beijing about creating full scale military alliance (Lam 1999). Foreign Minister Inanov boasted in July 1999 that the strategic partnership with China had noticeably strengthened, and that a further widening of Russia-Chinese relation could be expected. Inanov contended that such a development would be an important stabilizing factor for the world. From the standpoint of American interests, a Moscow-Beijing entente would have been a deeply disturbing development. It would have signaled a major shift in the configuration of global political, military, and economic power that would make the United States less secure. China is a great power and Russia, although at the moment a great power in distress retains serious military capabilities and a vast economic potential. If those powers had arrayed themselves against United States, the world would have become a decidedly less secure and less friendly place for American interests in the following decades. Moreover, a Russian-China partnership could have become the organizational core of an even larger counter hegemonic coalition directed against the United States. One possible version would be Primakov’s proposed triangular alliance of Russia, China, and India. Other nations alarmed at the aggressive posture adopted by a U.S.-led NATO might be tempted to cooperate with such a coalition.
CONCLUSION
Clearly demonstrated by this paper is that wars unarguably, are not without effects and obvious consequences. Inspite of its seeming utilities as the Realists would argue, war is an enigma. Besides the obvious damaging effects of wars on the countries or country that participate in them, wars equally produce resultant implications on issues and persons in societies beyond the territorial limits of the war zone. As shown by this study, the NATO-Serbia War carried with it some obvious consequences on people and issues that are entirely outside of the territorial confines of both Serbia and NATO countries. There was inter alia, a tidal wave of refugees from Serbia that placed both economic and political pressure on the neighbouring countries. The war and its modus operandi set a wrong and dangerous international precedent, and damaged United States’ relationship with both China and Russia. It made all Serbia’s neighbours register trade declines through war-induced trade disruptions. The lesson of the war is but imperative for the international system that peace is imperatively indivisible, and that the multiplier effect of war is transboundary. In this global age of complex interdependence, unilateral pursuit of peace is grossly inadequate and endangering to the stability of the international system. As has been said, NATO and Americans were strangely oblivious to the reality that in most parts of the world, the air strikes on Serbia were viewed not as prosecution of a just war to prevent genocide, but as a brutal attack on a small nation that was incapable of striking back. Such attitude left on the minds of many countries, a sense of the need for constructing a counter hegemonic coalition. However the United States-led UNATO war on Serbia may be viewed, it was extraordinarily myopic to pay the price jeopardizing NATO’s (and more specifically, America’s) relations with two great powers to pursue a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. That approach should not have survived even a cursory cost/benefit calculation. Indeed, to sacrifice relationships with Russia and China merely for the emotional satisfaction of dictating the political status of an obscure province in a small Balkan country is akin to a chess player’s sacrificing a knight and a queen to capture a worthless pawn. One does not have to be chess grand master to recognize that such a move is appallingy bad strategy. Yet that was the kind strategy that the United States and NATO adopted to achieve “victory” in Serbia.

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