“Drunken, Desperate Men:” The Klans of Gwinnett County, Georgia, 1868-1872
By Tyler Holman
Gunfire and the smell of smoked roused the residents of Lawrenceville, the seat of Gwinnett County, Georgia, on the night of September 10, 1871. They awoke to find the county courthouse on the town square engulfed in flames as six arsonists fled the scene on horseback. Although they and their horses were obscured by white robes their disguises, like the gunshots they fired into the sky as they fled, were intended to intimidate rather than to conceal. The Superior Court was to be in session in a few hours, calling the criminal docket, but everything pertaining to the next morning’s business was lost. Even with the promise of a reward to anyone who would brave the flames to save the records inside, the fire destroyed almost all the county’s legal documents. The residents of Lawrenceville were well aware that the perpetrators were members of the Ku Klux Klan, but few were willing to oppose them. Relying on fear to protect themselves from prosecution, the Klan had operated with near impunity over the past year. Sheriff Martin Van Buren Brand’s efforts to raise a posse to pursue the arsonists turned up only one volunteer, but in the hours after the fire he managed to capture three men suspected of the arson.¹

While the parties responsible for the fire went unnamed in subsequent histories of the county, it nevertheless remains a pivotal event in the county’s history and offers some insight into the unique social and political structure of a county which straddled the slave society of Georgia’s Black Belt and the more isolated yeoman-dominated Upcountry. Although the history of the Ku Klux Klan has been covered extensively in works such as Allen Trelease’s *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction*, and more recently in Elaine Parson’s *Ku-Klux: The Birth of the Klan during Reconstruction*, these works have focused on Klan activity in areas like the South Carolina Piedmont or Georgia’s Black Belt counties, where plantation slavery had been much more well established, and were party politics and the racial
population was more evenly divided than in Upcountry counties like Gwinnett. They have also tended to see local Klan organizations as extensions of a shared ideology, examining ‘aberrant’ Klan activity which diverged from this pattern only in passing. Those studies which have examined the Klan in an Upcountry context have nevertheless followed the pattern established by Trelease rather than focusing on those aspects which make this context unique, especially the appropriation, as it were, of Klan identity by criminals who lacked a strong commitment to its ideological purpose.²

It is that ‘aberrant’ activity and the lack of a shared ideology among many Klan groups which this paper attempts to explore, revealing a more complex reality in which Klansmen were driven by a variety of highly localized motivations which were not necessarily ideological at all. In examining these aspects, it is hoped that a better understanding of some otherwise little examined elements of the history of the Ku-Klux Klan can be derived, and that some light may be shed on the function of Klan organizations on a local level.³

The Ku Klux Klan was founded in Pulaski, Tennessee, in 1866, and soon thereafter spread throughout the South. The standard interpretation of the motives of the Reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan has long been that they existed to preserve the social order of the Old South, to act as a vigilante organization to respond to what they perceived as the threats posed by freedmen and Republicans. This meant opposing Reconstruction by targeting Northerners identified as having come South to exploit the post-Civil War situation (“carpetbaggers”) and Reconstruction-supporting Southerners (“scalawags”), and frequently terrorizing the newly enfranchised population of freedmen to facilitate the restoration of local Democrat political control. While that was certainly the stated mission of the Klan as espoused by Nathan Bedford Forrest, the figure most commonly associated with it, it should not necessarily be assumed that it
represented the only motivation of all Klansmen or that all Klan organizations followed any form of national leadership. They were local organizations with local leaders and motivations which were far more complex than disaffected Confederate veterans fighting to preserve a “Lost Cause,” especially outside of politically charged areas. By 1869, Forrest felt that the Klan was out of control, deviating from what he claimed had been “its original honorable and patriotic purposes,” with local organizations being filled with men of low repute and driven by goals which were more personal than political. He called on the organization to disband, but this had little effect on Klan activities throughout the South, and its specter would exert great influence on Georgia politics from 1868 to 1870.4

Reconstruction in Gwinnett County defied the traditional narrative of ‘carpetbaggers’ and ‘scalawags’ in a number of ways. Its enslaved population had been relatively low compared to its neighbors, and large-scale enslaved labor had primarily existed in the southern portion of the county bordering Walton, Newton and DeKalb counties. By 1870 the county had 12,431 residents, 2,159 were black, or just less than twenty percent of the total population. In line with this relatively small population, incidents of reported racial violence were less common than in neighboring counties, and no freedman had been elected or appointed to any political office. The reception of the Freedmen’s Bureau in Gwinnett County had been complex; although it frequently acted in the capacities seen elsewhere, mediating disputes and negotiating wage payments, it became an important institution for many of the county’s poor whites as well. Faced with post-war economic destitution, many citizens depended on rations distributed by the Bureau to survive, to the point that the Athens Southern Watchman declared that in Gwinnett and neighboring counties, “the privilege of ‘drawing’ is greatly abused, and will cause many to slacken their effort.” Early on, wealthy white residents were even willing to support the Bureau’s
mission of providing education to freedpeople, but that relationship between the Bureau and the county’s white residents soured whenever it became involved in matters of civil rights. The earliest reported incident of racial violence in the county occurred after the Bureau began to encourage voter registration among the freedmen, and by early 1868 the local Bureau agent reported that he had been assaulted twice by white residents.5

Voter intimidation and disenfranchisement occurred, but nowhere near the level seen in counties with large freed populations, where intimidation and violence were rampant during the 1868 elections. In 1868, despite reports of violence and intimidation at the polls, Rufus Bullock, the Republican candidate for governor received 36% of the vote, which was likely close to a fair representation of the county’s population. Although Georgians elected Republican Rufus Bullock governor in April, Klan violence and intimidation throughout the summer and fall managed to shift the electorate to ensure that Democrat presidential candidate Horatio Seymour carried Georgia in November. Although Congress readmitted the state to the Union in July, the expulsion of black members of the General Assembly prompted Congressional Republicans to place the state back under military control. This led to a resurgence of Reconstruction policies that greatly enflamed political tensions in the state. It was the 1870 election that would be essential to restoring the state government to Democrat control (“redeeming it,” in the terms of the day), and it was the 1870 election that seemed to light the spark of the Klan’s activities in Gwinnett County. By the time of the 1872 election, the Republican candidate for governor would receive only 3.1% of the vote, and the local newspaper openly praised the “considerable effort made to carry all the votes” for the Democratic candidate.6

In December 1870, Bullock appointed Charles Hendricks, an African American carpenter from Butts County, to serve as an election manager for the Pinkneyville (now Norcross) precinct.
A skilled carpenter, Hendricks had been living and working in the county for several years, endeavoring to organize and educate the community of freed slaves that lived in the community. He consistently asserted his right to vote, which earned the ire of some of his neighbors. For him to be appointed to a political office, no matter how small, was too much for some to bear. The next day Hendricks was

Two weeks before Election Day, a band of Hendricks’s neighbors clad in crudely improvised disguises arrived at his doorstep and demanded that he come outside. Two of the unwelcome visitors forced their way in before Hendricks could get to the door, menacing him and his wife at gunpoint. Although they wore crude masks, Hendricks knew the leader’s voice to be that of his neighbor, Hiram Wilson, who, it was later noted, wore his wife’s dress as a disguise. Hendricks also recognized Wilson “by his teeth; [which were] all knocked out in front.” Operating in the southern part of the county, where slavery had been most prevalent, Wilson fit the profile historians have generally assigned for a Klansman: he was a Confederate veteran, he came from a family of some means but was by no means an elite. In 1860 he had defaulted on his taxes, and was described as drunkard who resented the political enfranchisement of African Americans, having previously attacked Hendricks during the election of 1868. Wilson and another Klansman searched the Hendricks’ house for money, weapons, and anything else of value as the victim pleaded for his life. His wife Martha managed to escape during the chaos, running with her infant daughter to a neighbor’s house. A struggle ensued soon after she left when Wilson and his companion announced their intention to hang Hendricks, who tried to wrestle their weapons away. From the safety of a neighbor’s house, Martha Hendricks heard several gunshots in the night. By the time her father had gathered a group of neighbors to go to Hendricks’s house, they found him shot through the thigh and laying outside. He was badly injured but still alive. Wilson and the other assailants had fled.
taken to Atlanta, where he was safe from his assailants, to have the bullet lodged in his stomach, removed by a surgeon. The injury continued to plague him in later years.\textsuperscript{11}

Governor Bullock issued a proclamation offering a $1,000 reward for “for the apprehension, with evidence to convict, of any one or more of the disguised parties engaged in the… murderous assault,” but Wilson was not arrested immediately. Although Klansmen terrorized many white residents of the county, they also had a good number of supporters. As Sheriff Brand explained, there were parts of the county where residents “would not let me hold a person even if I arrested him.” The southern section of the county was one of those areas: one of Brand’s own deputies was a member of the Klan there.\textsuperscript{12}

Throughout most of 1871, the Klan operated with near impunity in Gwinnett County. Its preferred targets were those least likely to attract attention from authorities: recently freed slaves who lacked the political support like Charles Hendricks. In April, 1871, the U.S. Congress formed a joint select committee to collect testimony about Klan activity throughout the South. In November of that year William Mitchell, a Gwinnett County freedman, testified before the committee, describing one such visit by the Klan. According to Mitchell, “my son-in-law, they… gave him a severe whipping [and] beat my wife over the head with a pistol pretty severely. One of them… gave me four or five licks with a hickory.”\textsuperscript{13}

Although Hendricks attack followed the pattern of racial violence already seen in the county, the rise of the Ku Klux Klan in the county represented a widening of the scope of violence, not only in terms of why victims were targeted, but also in terms of who was targeted. Rather than retaliating against freedpeople who were seen as overstepping their position in society, the Klan in Gwinnett County often acted as much as a criminal organization as an ideological one. Operating in the eastern part of the county as well as in neighboring Walton
County, William Felker was a bootlegger who leveraged his leadership of the Klan to attack and intimidate anyone who might inform the authorities of his illegal distillery, as well as to protect its members from the consequences of even the pettiest of crimes. Henry Hayes, a freedman, described how he caught a white neighbor stealing his potatoes, only to have the same neighbor return with Felker and other Klansmen. According to Hayes, “They made me get down on my knees, and then they commenced whipping me …. They took a pistol and fired it off on the right side of my head, and said if they heard I told they would come back and kill me.” Even Charles Hendricks noted that the Klan had been “disturbing both white and black whipping some, robbing them, taking what little money and other things they had.”

Not all Klan victims were marginalized members of society. White Republicans and anyone perceived as protecting freedmen were also targets. Klansmen paid a visit to E.H. Chambers, a wealthy white farmer, and forced him to show them to the freedpeople contracted to work for him. The Klansmen accused some of the freedmen of theft, others of insulting the Klan, though Chambers maintained their innocence. In sworn testimony, he claimed that the Klansmen “treated me as if I was a freedman, or worse, perhaps. They called me ‘boy,’ and ordered me around… They ordered out the [freedman] and his wife… and I could hear tremendous licks” Chambers recognized many of the visitors as his neighbors and testified to their presence before local and federal authorities.

While the Enforcement Act of 1871, which was signed into law by President Ulysses S. Grant in April 1871, specifically targeted the Klan by making participation in any such organization illegal, it did not provide immediate relief for Gwinnett County. The standard approach taken by most officials in Gwinnett County, and in much of the South, was to ignore the Klan and its doings. Those who did oppose the Klan seemed to be more interested in its
criminal elements – bootlegging and gambling, in particular, were of primary interest. Those who did openly oppose the Klan often regretted it. Attempts to prosecute Klan members were often met with threatening letters. One such letter, addressed to a witness in a Klan case in Gwinnett County, warned: “If one syllable escapes you tending towards the conviction of any of the Parties against whom your name stands as a States Witness you will go to the uther [sic] side of the Jordan.” Such letters were common.\textsuperscript{16}

In Gwinnett County, no place and no one was safe from Klan intimidation. Sheriff Brand reported how a church meeting in the northern part of the county had been disrupted when “a party that they accused of belonging to this Ku-Klux got up a row about the preaching, and got to shooting pistols about, and broke up the church.” Even that very public incident went unpunished. In the aftermath, “A justice of the peace who was present saw that happen, and he issued warrants… he handed the subpoenas over to the parties… and they just tore them up, and did not pay any attention to them at all.” Shortly thereafter, the justice of the peace resigned after receiving threats from the Klan.\textsuperscript{18}

Sheriff Brand was one of the few individuals who was undeterred by the Klan’s threats. “I have always made arrests when I went to do it,” he said. But he was aware that the Klan was often beyond reach and that prosecuting the Klan took ingenuity. Brand used the fact that Klan members tended to live on the margins of the law to his advantage and began to arrest them for a litany of unrelated crimes, such as gambling and bootlegging. More indictments gradually made life harder for Klansmen. Hiram Wilson, who had assaulted Charles Hendricks, was indicted for his crimes. Wilson apparently had friends in high places, as his $1000 bail was quickly paid by a group of the county’s wealthiest citizens, including George H. Jones. Jones, the son of one of the county’s largest slave owners and who had served in the 42\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry alongside Wilson, now
represented the southern section of the county in Georgia’s General Assembly. Wilson remained free while his trial was delayed several times. All told, Sheriff Brand said that there were at least twelve cases pending against Klan members, and that “they found they could not run off the witnesses for the State, and the only chance to keep off the prosecution was to burn the records.”

That was the situation on the fateful night of September 10, 1871, when six masked figures rode into Lawrenceville by cover of darkness and set fire to the courthouse. As the building went up in flames, so too did the evidence against Klan members. Beyond the practical effect, the fire sent a chilling message of defiance. As efforts by the Federal Government were finally producing some results in dismantling the Klan, the fire signaled loud and clear that the Gwinnett County Klan was very much alive and would not be brought down so easily by authorities.

Sheriff Brand and his one-man posse managed to arrest three men that morning: Z.A. Hamilton, John Reynolds, and William A. Patrick. They found them scared and their horses tired, one missing a shoe. The men claimed they had been playing cards when the courthouse burned, although John Hill, who sold whiskey from his home near Lawrenceville, later testified that Patrick, who was only twenty years old, had drunkenly bragged about joining the Klan. Finding one of them with matches and a pistol in his pocket, Brand arrested the trio for arson. Once again, the county elite came to the defense of the Klan, and the men were hastily freed on grounds of habeas corpus following the efforts of local attorney William E. Simmons. Simmons had served as an officer in the Confederate army and would have been well acquainted with George H. Jones, since both men represented the county in the General Assembly.
The Klan’s membership in Gwinnett County was primarily drawn from men of low social standing, and often from the lower classes in general. These were men whose character was considered, in the words of Sheriff Brand, to be “generally bad,” men whose troubles with the law predated their involvement in the Klan and often went hand in hand with alcoholism. Membership in the Klan offered them a chance to ensure that they were not economically surpassed by freedmen, as well as a chance to assert their status above some of their white neighbors and to earn the respect of some members of the county’s political leaders.²²

Within days, Sheriff Brand requested federal assistance and James Skiles, a United States Deputy Marshall, was dispatched to Gwinnett County. Previously a private investigator and railroad agent, Skiles was experienced in combating the Klan and had been pursuing Klansmen across the South for several years. Skiles’s pursuit of the Klan had put him in great danger. In 1869, a detective working with him on a case in Tennessee had been abducted and murdered by the Klan. Skiles was familiar with the difficulties of apprehending Klansmen and made his best effort to arrest the arsonists on any charges possible, bringing in other Klan members in the process. The arsonists were used to operating with impunity and made no attempt to flee or resist when Skiles arrested them for illegal distilling. Implicating them in the arson of the courthouse was more difficult. When Sheriff Brand found that no justice of the peace would issue a warrant against them on that charge, Detective Skiles then took them to Atlanta and attempted to bring federal charges against them as members of the Ku Klux Klan. That also proved more difficult than expected. ²³

Soon after the men were brought to Lawrenceville, Simmons arrived to again serve as their legal counsel. This time his recourse was less than legal. He warned Skiles that if he “should dare to remove those men [he] would be mobbed.” Simmons’s efforts were successful,
and the men were again released. This was not new to Skiles, who had seen something similar in neighboring Jackson County, where arrests had only been possible with assistance of federal troops. That Simmons took an interest in the case signaled that men who burned the courthouse did so with approval of the county elite, which is illustrative of how local Klan organizations brought together men with vastly different backgrounds and goals for “mutual protection and benefit,” as one observer put it. Not only did the fire protect bootleggers and petty criminals like William Felker, but also men like Hiram Wilson, who appears to have had close ties to some of the county’s leading citizens.24

By this point, the political will to prosecute Klan members was weak, even on a federal level. Efforts to combat the Klan focused heavily on South Carolina, where the violence had reached especially fierce levels, and Reconstruction and civil rights for freedpeople became less and less important as the national political climate shifted towards economic concerns. Detective Skiles and Sheriff Brand continued to make further arrests, but to little avail. Even cases brought before a federal grand jury failed to result in prosecutions.25

No Klansman in Gwinnett County seemed to suffer any serious consequences for Klan activities, including the burning of the courthouse. A Gwinnett grand jury went so far as to declare the fire a work of arson and to offer a $500 reward for the apprehension of the guilty parties, but no indictment was ever handed down against the men accused of committing the act. The increased attention and changing political climate led to Klan activity tapering off in general, including in Gwinnett County.26

The Klan’s demise was as much from outliving its usefulness as from being brought down by the authorities. Due in no small part to the efforts of the Klan, Georgia Democrats won a major victory in the 1870 election. This left Governor Bullock virtually powerless, and in
October of 1871 he resigned from office and fled the South. With the political will behind Reconstruction weakening, the disenfranchisement of the black population was gradually enshrined in law, and the Klan’s brutal intimidation tactics were no longer needed. As a result, the Klan was deserted by its political patrons and eventually faded away. Its memory would be romanticized, eventually inspiring the creation of the more well-known racist fraternal order in the 1920s and 1930s, white robes and all.

The activities of the Gwinnett County Klan reveals much about how these organizations functioned on a local level, who its rank and file members were and what motivated them. These were autonomous organizations, and at least outside of the Black Belt, their motivations tended to be far less political than is generally assumed. While county and state elites may have directed the Klan’s politically motivated actions and protected its members from the consequences of those actions, most of the men who participated in Klan violence were of a decidedly non-elite status. They were men whom Sheriff Brand referred to as “generally bad,” men whose actions were often fueled by alcohol, and men whose neighbors looked down upon them. They were men like Melvin Kennedy, who participated in the assault upon E.H. Chambers, and was described as “a kind of drunken, desperate man,” and accused of flaunting, rather than hiding, his supposedly secret membership in the Klan in a bid to inspire deference from his white neighbors.

Enhancing their reputation by inspiring fear and respect from other whites seems to have been a common motivation for these men. Like Kennedy, William Patrick, one of the men implicated in the arson of the courthouse, had a drinking problem and flaunted his membership in the Klan to others. Both he and his brother Frederick bragged about their membership in the Klan.” 

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Alcohol and status motivated these men in more than one sense. They were hard drinkers, and often engaged in illegal distilling themselves. Their membership in the Klan offered these men a way to ensure that the newly freed population did not threaten their already precarious position in society, as well as a chance to assert themselves above their white neighbors. The efforts of local law enforcement to control the Klan likely had more to do with its otherwise criminal behavior than with its assaults on freedpeople, which are mentioned only in passing in Sheriff Brand’s testimony.

There were, as Sheriff Brand noted, Klans in Gwinnett County, with varying degrees of communication between one another, and varying degrees of deviation from the stated agenda of the national Klan. Some members, like Hiram Wilson, were Confederate veterans who may well have wanted a return to the old order and who reacted violently to the political enfranchisement of African Americans. And certainly local elites like George H. Jones and William E. Simmons had an interest in maintaining the racial and political order of the Old South in a changing world. They could not abide seeing a man like Charles Hendricks exercising any degree of authority, and the fact that the Klan fostered racial division likely helped assuage their fears that poor whites might see some commonality between themselves and African Americans, something which had been the subject of paranoid rhetoric even during the Antebellum period. At the same time there were others who appropriated the image of the Klan for reasons which differed greatly from its stated goals: they wrote threatening letters to witnesses in gambling cases, broke up the meetings of white churches which spoke against them, forced the resignation of law enforcement officials who opposed them, and perhaps most commonly of all, guarded illegal distilling operations. In short, they functioned as organized crime syndicates.28
African Americans remained the primary target of Klan violence in these areas. Local authorities were often willing to overlook the sorts of criminals who took refuge within the Klan, and so it was federal authorities that were the primary threat to bootleggers. African Americans and, in a few cases, white Republicans, were by far the most likely people to report these distillers to federal authorities, and therefore it is easy to understand why they were the primary targets. Besides, freedmen were easy targets with little legal recourse, and even in the Upcountry their enfranchisement was subject to great resentment.²⁹

William Jennings, a Republican from Ohio who served as the Internal Revenue assessor for the fourth district of Georgia, including Gwinnett County, made this case quite well when he stated that he believed “that there is such a thing as a Ku-Klux organization in the fourth district of Georgia: and I believe its members are principally illicit distillers and illicit traders in tobacco… I think their object is to protect each other… I do not think, so far as Northeastern Georgia is concerned, it has much political significance, at least not so much as it has in Southern Georgia.”³⁰

Although it does shed light on the inner workings of local Klan organizations, none of this evidence changes the fact that the Klan was a domestic terrorist organization; indeed, it reinforces it. It was only because of the racial violence, brutality and intimidation embodied in the Klan’s original mission that it was possible for its image to be harnessed to other ends. Today, a courthouse completed in 1885 overlooks Lawrenceville’s town square. Visitors will find no memorial to what transpired there in 1871, nor to the countless victims of the Gwinnett County Klan.
8 Gwinnett County 1860 Tax Digest, Gwinnett Historical Society; Report of the Joint Select Committee 515-517.
16 Wade, Fiery Cross, 90-93.
18 Report of the Joint Select Committee 354.
22 Ibid; Parsons, Ku-Klux, 112, 118-120.
24 Report of the Joint Select Committee 746, 1134.
26 Weekly Gwinnett Herald, 17 April, 1872.
27 Report of the Joint Select Committee 713.
30 Report of the Joint Select Committee 1134.
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