The Canadian Cognitive Bias and its Influence on Canada/U.S. Relations

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Cover Page Footnote
Ken Holmes is a CPA with a practice area in profiling people, corporations, and countries.
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Our unsolicited advice to Washington about the war on terror goes mostly unheeded, our small military contributions largely unappreciated. And far from our cherished self-image as the world's "helpful fixer," a sort of moral superpower, both Democrats and Republicans have come to view us as unhelpful nixers. Like the know-it-all neighbour who never misses a chance to bend your ear over the back fence or critique your yardwork, Canada has become the block bore...Things between our countries are apparently getting worse all the time. And, the evidence suggests, the attitude problem is almost entirely our own.¹

Canadians have a deep subconscious bias towards its neighbor to the south that manifests itself in fear, awe, arrogance and admiration. One would think that by now Canada would have outgrown this challenge. Canadians watch the same television. Their media bombards its viewers with many of the same advertisements as their American counterparts, and millions of Canadians travel to the United States each year. However, the Canadian population has a subconscious longevity that breeds the same reactions today as it did 120 years ago.

Additionally, Canadians have a national characteristic best known as ‘clam-up.’ They manifest this trait when an event occurs that causes great sadness, fear, or embarrassment. When this happens, few people – if anyone – will talk about that issue, particularly those in the media, civil servants, or politicians. For example, one can see evidence of ‘clam-up’ in Canadian reactions to politicians who favor introducing government financial support for private schools, an unpopular issue in Canada since the 1890s. Security and intelligence initiatives that are historically nationally and regionally personal, such as World War I and responses to radical Islam, also cause “clam-up.” This trait is very subtle and can only be detected if one understands the unique history in which the roots of this trait rest. The population will obliterate any public official that does not read the signs behind the silence and embraces the ‘wrong’ policy at that moment. This bias and the secondary effects are at times pervasive and can work in opposition
to the policies and programs initiated by the nation’s security and intelligence community. This study examines these themes from a historical perspective, studying how the past connects with the future.

The purpose of this research is to explore the extent of such cognitive bias, and reflect on its contemporary significance to Canada-U.S. relations, particularly in the area of national security. The conclusion identifies issues that policymakers should further explore that may require strategies to mitigate possible future negative challenges. Today, the Canadian security and intelligence community has an excellent working arrangement with the U.S. and with its Commonwealth partners. Richard Aldrich affirms this assertion noting, “The most remarkable example of cooperation is the English-speaking effort in the realm of signals intelligence known as UKUSA. Sharing in this realm between the United States, the UK, Australia, and Canada is so complete that national product is often indistinguishable.”

However, this cooperation is periodically squeezed by the stress generated when defense and intelligence realities differ from Canadian perceptions of the United States. In 2013, Paul Koring, the Washington correspondent for the Toronto Globe and Mail newspaper, reported on a national poll conducted by Nanos Research and the University of Buffalo on the “Widening Gaps on Human Rights and National Security.” Quoting Mr. Nanos, Koring wrote, “Across all the indicators, there is an increasing sense of drift in the Canada-U.S. relationship. It could be a result of a combination of factors including miscommunication and neglect on both sides of the border.” Unless remedial steps are taken, the relationship will continue to deteriorate, Mr. Nanos said. “If we see the drift continue, then Canada-U.S relations will become just a series of irritants between neighbours that should have very good relations,” Mr. Nanos added. He said he believed the drop reflected a range of American policies, from Mr. Obama’s preference for
missile-firing drones to kill suspects overseas, to U.S. spy agencies trolling of individuals’ data and threats to attack Syria over its use of chemical weapons. “We see an accumulation effect … on a number of fronts, including security surveillance and drones, but Syria is the signature event… It’s an issue that Barack Obama has 100 percent ownership of,” Mr. Nanos said before publicly releasing the survey’s findings.³

When this cognitive bias activates Canadians on historically significant themes, the consequences can produce challenges for policymakers. A current example that parallels Canadian reactions to national security is healthcare, an area where Canadians believe their nation holds the high ground over Americans with respect to universal access and fairness. Nora Jacobson, an American who relocated to Canada in 2001, asserts in “Before You Flee to Canada, Can We Talk,” that Canadian anti-American bias can generate ‘policy blindness’ as “Canadians often point to their system of universal health care as the best example of what it means to be Canadian (because the United States does not provide it), but this means that any effort to adjust or reform that system (which is not perfect) precipitates a national identity crisis: To wit, instituting co-payments or private MRI clinics will make Canada too much like the United States.”⁴ Notice in this health care example two significant points; Canadians believe (without question) that their healthcare system is better than the U.S., and many refuse to discuss positive change to the system if an idea emulates the U.S. system.

Students of history can view a similar trend with respect to national security. In 2011, confidential documents released by WikiLeaks revealed that Jim Judd, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) expressed dismay over Canadian attitudes about global terrorism, which could be described as willful bliss, similar to that in health care example. William Potter of the Toronto Star’s Washington Bureau wrote:
Canadians have an “Alice in Wonderland” attitude toward global terrorism, the former head of Canada’s spy service told a U.S. counterpart in 2008, according to a secret American memo disclosed Monday. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Director Jim Judd is also quoted as saying that Canadian courts have the security service “tied in knots,” hampering their ability to detect and prevent terror attacks inside Canada and beyond. Judd’s comments on Canadians and their courts echo private remarks made at CSIS headquarters in Ottawa, where security officials sometimes sarcastically refer to the legal obstacles as “judicial jihad.”

The ‘Alice in Wonderland attitude’ is code for the mindset explained by Jacobson. The varied court rulings referred to above on terrorist suspects reflect the more so called ‘tolerant’ tendencies that many Canadians embrace compared with their American cousins, and hence explain the frustrations voiced by CSIS in their fight against global terrorism when national security requirements conflict with certain Canadian belief systems. Fundamentally, Canada and the U.S. must work closely together to address international security threats (i.e. ISIS and Ebola), and both nations do not have the luxury to engage in differences driven by inherent biases that could weaken a badly needed North American resolve.

This paper will address one research question that focuses upon the extent of the bias and whose answer will direct analysts to the following hypothesis: History demonstrates that Canada-U.S. relations are influenced by a national cognitive bias against the U.S. that has created difficulties and pose future challenges for policymakers who must make choices for the betterment of North American national security. The research question is: Does Canada’s federal election of 1891 reflect the truism ‘with change comes the status quo’ concerning the attitude that many Canadians share toward the U.S., and is that bias sufficiently significant to warrant special attention by policymakers?

This research focuses on Canadian attitudes toward the U.S. that affected both actions and decisions by policymakers. The first section will provide a literature review and an
overview of the methodology employed. Section two, “The Historical Perspective,” defines the philosophical differences between the founding of Canada and of America. This background places the election of 1891 as the centerpiece event that repeats itself for the next one hundred years. Section three, “With Change Comes the Status Quo” illustrates through examples how issues raised in the 1891 election resurface in Canada/U.S. relations through to the twenty-first century, while section four, “Reflections for the Twenty-First Century,” identify situations that mirror historical attitudes of 1891, this time with a focus on the future. The conclusion presents identifies issues that require attention by policymakers. The conclusion identifies issues that require attention from policymakers.

Literature Review

The study of Canadian bias toward the U.S. is a complicated subject with many historically-focused and current sources that present discussions on thematic areas such as economics, political science, and related policy implications between the two countries. Forty-six sources support the analysis in this research paper; each one assessed through the lenses of three questions: what does the literature say, not say, and why it is important. The sources reveal four themes related to Canadian attitudes toward the U.S.: the origin of the Canadian bias, the conflict between two visions for Canada (continental emphasis vs. Europe), oscillation between perspectives (sometimes pro-American, sometimes against) but under a backdrop of suspicion of the U.S., and strong support for America when the nation faces grave difficulties. Canadian attitudes towards the U.S. have its origins in the philosophical differences stemming from the founding of the two countries. Robert Ferguson, a communications expert for U.S. multinational corporations, outlines the differences on his website, “Canada: Peace, Order Good Government.” He notes that Canada is founded on the principles of “peace, order, and good
government” though the Constitution Act of 1867, while U.S. thinking is based on the declaration of independence from Great Britain where citizens are entitled to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” The former is structured on loyalty to the supremacy of the Crown, while the latter elevates “the right of the individual” as defined by principles.

Ferguson’s explanation focuses on the ideas published in two prominent Canadian news journals at the beginning of the U.S. Civil War, the Montreal Gazette and the Toronto Globe as documented by Brian Gabrial in “The Second American Revolution: Expressions of Canadian Identity in News Coverage at the Outbreak of the United States Civil War.” Gabrial found that the editorials expressed antipathy toward the experiment of U.S. democracy based on individual rights, fear of American militarism, and possible U.S. invasion, patronizing sympathy for Americans, while at the same time, expressions of certain sympathies for the American South. Although Gabrial’s work is limited to the 1861 to 1865 period, the author provides the groundwork for scholars to understand Christopher Pennington’s research, The Destiny of Canada: Macdonald, Laurier and the Election of 1891.

Through both a biographical and historical approach, Pennington documents Canadian attitudes towards two conflicting national identity perspectives; a Canada connected to a continental vision with the U.S. and a nation focused towards the British Empire and eventually Europe. The author explains in detail this ‘go-silent’ characteristic of the Canadian population (so evident today) through his descriptions of how political opponents avoided raising issues related to religion and education, two subjects connected to the great divide between English and French Canada. If both leaders engaged in conflict over these two ‘unspeakable areas’ the consequences could have led to disintegration of Canada. Pennington’s research serves as an
evidentiary starting point as it is the first election in Canada where the population voted on Canada’s future.

As Canadian history moved through the twentieth century, one can see both intense periods of anti-U.S. sentiments and periods of close cooperation with the Americans. Simon Potter in *The Imperial Significance of the Canadian-American Reciprocity Proposals of 1911*, provides an in-depth account of Canadian and British reactions to the second attempt to realize a free-trade agreement with the U.S. The author illustrates the nature of the opposition to the agreement in the context of Canada’s ties and sympathies toward the British Empire and draws on parallels with Laurier’s first attempt to promote a trade agreement. A noted player in Canadian politics at that time was Sir Clifford Sifton, Canada’s Minister of the Interior until 1905. Clifton was both anti-free trade and a strong proponent of a public education system (a significant Canadian preference until this day). D.J. Hall, in his book, *Clifford Sifton: A Lonely Eminence 1901-1929*, adds to Potter’s understanding of Sifton, and provides insights into why the Canadian bias against the U.S. subsided dramatically after World War I. A study of Sir Sifton reveals the extent of the dichotomy so evident in many Canadians today; at times Canadians oppose economic integration with the U.S. while at other times, the population supports a close relationship with the U.S. on foreign policy. At times the positions often reverse.

As the world approached the Second World War, Canadians not only turned to the Americans for support, but the federal government, with the full encouragement of Great Britain, conducted a covert operation in the U.S. to encourage Americans to enter the war. William Stevenson in *A Man Called Intrepid*, explains the strategic thinking behind Canada’s and Britain’s position, while Phillip Hodgson adds to Stevenson’s research as he explains in
Dispatches for Camp X, how Canadian and American senior public servants worked together on these activities. This cemented the relationship between the security and intelligence communities of both nations.

After WWII, relations between Canada and the U.S. appeared stable as citizens of both countries experienced economic growth and were engaged in the Korean War. The situation changed substantially when the Canadian aerospace industry created the Avro Arrow, an advanced supersonic jet fighter program. The United States successively lobbied to kill the project in Canada, as American policymakers advised Ottawa that the U.S. government would not purchase the jet. The “Arrow Digital Website,” run by former Avro employees, highlights why the Canadian bias began to return over this topic. In Kennedy and Diefenbaker: The Feud that Toppled a Government, Knowlton Nash describes the intense dislike between Prime Minister Diefenbaker and President Kennedy which culminated in fierce disagreements over another issue, namely Fidel Castro and the Cuban missile crises, during which the Canadian Prime Minster at first refused to cooperate with the Americans. Granastein and Hilmer in “Those Damn Yankees,” provide readers with a short, but thorough synopsis of Canada-U.S. relations during that period. Dennis Goresky and Johan Sigler in Public Opinion On United States-Canadian Relations, illustrate through surveys that Canada’s relationship with the U.S., while strained, did improve as a larger segment of the population expressed comfort with the Americans except on issues that related to Canadian culture, excessive American economic ownership, and certain aspects of foreign policy (Canadians generally supported Cuba). These two sources illustrate the Canadian dichotomy seen in history.

Goresky’s and Sigler’s attitudinal surveys into Canadian views are significant as they may explain the reason why in 1988 Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stepped into
the foray of Laurier’s 1891 election on free-trade – greater tolerance toward the U.S. in certain population segments. When one reviews Goresky’s paper, it appears logical to assume that the introduction of free-trade with the Americans would generate serious debate but not conflict. However, to the surprise of many Canadians and experts in foreign policy, several sources such as “Conservapedia”\(^ {18}\) (an historical website) documented the outright hostility the trade proposal generated in close to half the population. Lawrence Martin, in *The Pledge of Allegiance: The Americanization of Canada*,\(^ {19}\) corroborates Conservapedia’s views, however with a decided bias against the Prime Minister and the Americans. The surveys analyzed by Goresky did not pick up the ‘go quiet’ mood of Canadians, often described as the ‘clam up’ characteristic, which results in surprises for politicians and the media from the population. The literature supports the theme “With Change Comes the Status Quo” during the twentieth century, and the conflicting views of the population that Pennington found in his research on the election of 1891.

Canada began the twenty-first century in a similar mindset to the post-WWI period, with a fading anti-American bias. However, Steve Maich, in *Closer than You Think*,\(^ {20}\) demonstrates that Canadians exhibit contradictions between the popular bias against the U.S. and similarities of thinking between Canadians and Americans. Patrick Cain’s story for Global News, “Six in ten Canadians more concerned about a terrorist attack on Canada,”\(^ {21}\) corroborates Maich’s research. These sources confirm that this ‘contradicting view’ observed between the 1860s and 1945 continues today, namely that U.S. foreign policy makes sense, but do not under any circumstance give Canadian sovereignty to the Americans.

The literature review reveals that new challenges, such as issues surrounding water exports to the U.S., could complicate Canada/U.S. relations, thus ‘firing up’ the Canadian bias. In *A Fight Reborn*, Wilson-Smith reports that water exports became a major trade issue when
British Columbia passed legislation to ban bulk water exports to the U.S. Since 1999, Canadians have been silent on water, but it is highly likely the population has only buried the issue. This ‘silence’ characteristic can be seen in three news reports that described how two provincial elections were unexpectedly lost by the political party in the lead. This is critical because policies and programs, particularly in the highly vulnerable defense sector, could be delayed and/or cancelled due to unexpected public response.

This study could not locate sources that documented ‘audit evidence’ examples of how surprising shifts in public opinion negatively affected security and intelligence in Canada as most of that information is restricted. The literature does reveal specific and significant incidents which are referred to in the subsequent sections. Therefore the focus of this paper is on bias through historical lenses that concludes with issues that could affect Canada’s security and intelligence community; areas policymakers should investigate to minimize the risks.

Methodology and Definitions

The study utilizes the historical method, where one synthesizes well-documented historical events and biographies of key participants. Authors John O’Brien, Dan Remenyi, and Aideen Keaney, in Historiography – A Neglected Research Method in Business and Management Studies, assert:

Any real appreciation of the present requires an understanding of the past or the history of the situation. Those who know the history of the situation can more fully appreciate what is currently happening and the context in which it is happening. This implies a continuum in our existence and assumes not that in some respects the present or indeed the future looks something like the past but that the present or the future will be informed by the past. It is this ability of the past to inform the present and the future which makes historical studies interesting.

The historical approach is applicable for this research as it combines a case study (the election of 1891) with a chronology of events that includes surveys about Canada/U.S. relations
conducted over selected periods of time. The paper is narrative which examines a fragment of the past (the election of 1891) to explain present circumstances. The outcome of this research is a set of issues that policymakers should explore in the event they must mitigate possible risks of rejection by Canadians on critical policies required to advance Canada/U.S. relations. Historical scholars who draw their findings from original documents and are reliable are the primary source. The events that trigger Canadian reactions to the U.S. are causation in nature (i.e. a statement in the U.S. media triggers a reaction from Canadians). David Hume, a Scottish philosopher defined cause as “an object, followed by another, and where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.”

Hume’s definition connects the research questions, the hypothesis to the analysis.

There are several definitions critical to this research. The “Oxford Dictionary On-Line” defines bias as a “cause to feel or show inclination or prejudice against someone or something.” “Business Dictionary On-Line” defines cognitive bias as the “common tendency to acquire and process information by filtering it through one’s own likes, dislikes, and experiences.” Group bias is directly related to group-think, which is “the practice of thinking or making decisions as a group, resulting in typically in unchallenged, poor-quality decision making.”

The Historical Perspective

As indicated in the literature review, Canadian attitudes about the U.S. have their origins in the philosophical differences between the founding of Canada (peace, order, good government) and the U.S. (individual liberty). Ferguson’s explanation is consistent with Gabrié’s media reports on events during the U.S. Civil War. The editorials expressed: antipathy toward the experiment of U.S. democracy based on individual rights, fear of American
militarism, concern over a possible U.S. invasion of Canada, and patronizing sympathy for both the American North and the South. As an example, Gabrial reported the following from Canada’s two prominent newspapers in 1861:

As April 1861 came to an end, Brown [The Globe] wrote an editorial, headlined “Not Without its Drawbacks,” that expressed the general “British-Canadian suspicion of American democracy. The editorial, while supportive of Abraham Lincoln, remarked, “One of the results of the republican form of government is to develop to a greater extent than under any other system, the individuality of the people composing the nation.” The editorial continues, “Americans believe they can be president but the problem is they are taking actions and criticizing their leader without much regard.” To Brown, there was no “surer or shorter way to anarchy. Likewise, a May 3 Gazette editorial remark noted that it “is an absolute truth that the more you put power in the hands of the uneducated masses, the more you increase the influence of the demagogue, and lesson the conservative influence of wealth and intelligence.”  

By the 1880s, Canadian feelings towards America included a moral tone that moved beyond simply recognizing their divergent views of democracy. J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer wrote in “Those Damn Yankees”:

Canadians could effortlessly view their neighbours with a baleful gaze. They were rich and crass, but also immoral and violent. "We are free from many of the social cancers which are empoisoning the national life of our neighbours," wrote the Canadian Methodist Magazine in 1880. "We have no polygamous Mormondom; no Ku Klux terrorism . . . no cruel Indian massacres.” Wilfrid Laurier, prime minister at the turn of the century, professed the greatest admiration for the United States, but he went on to note America’s furious rate of murders and divorce, and thanked heaven “that we are living in a country where the young children of the land are taught Christian morals and Christian dogmas.”

The belief systems of Canadians, instilled through British influences and combined with fear of the U.S., created attitudes that would spawn conflict when politicians and leaders presented alternative visions for Canada and U.S. relations. This made the 1891 election a pivotal historical event.
Pennington, in *The Destiny of Canada and the Election of 1891* proclaims, “The great issue at stake was nothing less than that future relationship between Canada and the United States, and by extension, the future of Canada itself.” Canadians, with their suspicions of the U.S. hardened during the tumultuous times of the 1860s, found themselves confronting Canada’s destiny through a great political debate; free-trade (referred to as reciprocity at the time) with the U.S. or continued preferential trade with Great Britain to maintain the Empire. During that election, two of Canada’s greatest prime ministers engaged in a ferocious election campaign. Sir John A. MacDonald, then prime minister, leader of the Conservative Party (also referred to as the Tories), and a Protestant by religion sought re-election. He was the leading figure behind the creation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867. In 1885, MacDonald officiated the opening of Canada’s first coast-to-coast transcontinental railway, the Canadian Pacific. To protect the nation from absorption into the U.S. through economic integration, his government erected very high tariffs on American imports. MacDonald’s vision was to maintain Canada as part of the British Empire. Pennington quotes MacDonald’s passionate letter to the media:

> As for myself, my course is clear. A British Subject I was born - A British subject I will die. With my utmost effort, with my latest breath, will I oppose the “veiled treason” which attempts by sordid means and mercenary proffers to lure our people from their allegiance. During my long public service of nearly half a century, I have been true to my country and its best interests.”

The Tories harnessed the press to proclaim their position. Pennington writes that almost all major Canadian newspapers supported the Conservative position. MacDonald set the election tone for three quarters of the campaign when he declared that voters had one of two choices, “loyalty or treason.” Pennington reports that the *Boston Republic* newspaper handed the Tories and Canadian media “evidence of true American motives” on a silver platter, when it suggested, “it was high time for the Canadian people to stop worshipping Queen Victoria, an obese, beer
guzzling German woman who has no more claim on them than has the Ameer of Afghanistan.”

Such quotes from the U.S. media generated national anger. Pennington reports that in Halifax there was a festive rally of over 4,000 citizens with banners reading “God Save the Queen.” The U.S. media solidified MacDonald’s position and inadvertently elected the Tories in Canada. This also demonstrated the power and influence the U.S. media could have on Canadians.

MacDonald’s counterpart was Sir Wilfred Laurier, leader of the national Liberal Party, and a Roman Catholic, born in Quebec. Laurier’s vision for Canada was a nation that protected individual freedom and liberty, and hence was very American in tone. He believed in separation of church and state, which placed him at odds with the Roman Catholic Church. Pennington writes, “The powerful Roman Catholic Church traditionally supported them [the Conservatives] – parish priests were known to warn their flocks that Tory bleu was the colour of heaven and Liberal rouge the colour of hell and the Conservatives carried the vast majority of the province’s sixty five seats.” The Church played a significant role in the defeat of Laurier as many priests proclaimed him a supporter of the Protestant, prejudiced nation to the south that hated Catholics.

Laurier was not afraid of Americans. He believed in both personal and economic liberty, to the extent that he campaigned for a customs union with the U.S. where both countries would be tariff free. He initiated a strong counterattack against MacDonald’s loyalty thrust. Pennington reports that the Liberals reminded voters that MacDonald’s high tariff on policy on U.S. led to high prices and unemployment, facts that no one could deny. Laurier further proclaimed:

In his manifesto, Sir John as usual, appeals to the loyalty of his British subjects, against the prejudices of the Liberal Party. He says we are disloyal because we want reciprocity. Then he himself has been guilty of that crime, for formerly he advocated such a policy and recently, when he found that the
country was clamouring after free-trade, he again committed the same crime by stealing from us part of the program. No gentlemen, as of yor we are still true and loyal to our Sovereign Lady the Queen.\textsuperscript{34}

Laurier changed the direction of the campaign to reflect only the reciprocity argument as there were two silent “gorillas in the room” that both party leaders were cognizant of and desperate to avoid at all costs. The first was a deep simmering clash of English verses French that could tear the nation apart. The second was the famous ‘Manitoba School Question.’ When MacDonald’s government created the Province of Manitoba in 1870, the law required that province to provide services to both French and English populations. In the 1880’s Manitoba ceased funding Catholic schools in favor of the public school system, a policy direction that created a national furor in French and Catholic communities. All politicians went silent on the two matters throughout the campaign, as did the Canadian population. This event is the first recorded example of the ‘clam-up.’ In 1891, MacDonald’s Tories won the election focusing on Canada/U.S. trade issues with 118 seats while Laurier attained 90 seats.

With Change Comes the Status Quo

The Canadian cognitive bias illustrated in the election of 1891 did not change significantly during the first eleven years of the twentieth century. The First World War arrived and affected Canada deeply, leaving scars that would impact the nation for a hundred years. Relations with the United States continued to improve in the 1940s as both shared common enemies during the Second World War, which resulted in a thaw in the Canadian bias. However, attitudes froze for ten years, from 1956 through to the late 1960s and then in the late 1980s fierce debates ensued when free-trade hit the agenda one more time. In 1911 and 1988, Canadians repeated the reactions that voters held during the election of 1891.
MacDonald’s Tories reigned for five years after 1891, and were then defeated over the Manitoba School Question. The Conservatives, believers in a strong national central government, promised legislation to overturn the Manitoba government’s decision not to fund Catholic schools. Laurier, then leader of the Opposition, strongly opposed this centralization of power on the grounds such a policy intervened with provincial rights, a popular view held by citizens of Manitoba, and the central Canadian populations of Ontario and Quebec. Laurier advanced a solution that met the expectations of the conflicting interests; publicly funded Catholic schools where the population warranted funding, and defense for a public school system. As a result, Laurier won the election of 1896. During the next fourteen years of Liberal reign, Canada advanced technologically, with new lands opened for immigration.

Sir Clifford Sifton, Laurier’s Federal Minister of the Interior, travelled worldwide selling Canada to prospective immigrants as the ‘fields of dreams.’ Canada’s population grew by more than three million people between 1896 and 1914, reducing Clifton’s fear of an American annexation of western Canada. However, unresolved conflict lurked behind Laurier’s advancements. In 1905, Sifton resigned from the Liberal Cabinet, over disagreements with Laurier on national education. The Interior Minister strongly supported a national public education system, as opposed to adopting the American private/public system. Laurier was determined to leave education matters to the provinces. 35

In 1911, the Canada/U.S. trade issue, with widespread national concerns over American intentions, reared its head again. Laurier was defeated in 1911 when he tried again to introduce a Canada-U.S. trade agreement. The general election of that year was fiercely fought, largely on the free-trade issue, and Laurier's second attempt at reciprocity with the U.S. generated populist fear that free-trade was the first step to political annexation. In his research on Canada and its
relations with the U.S. under British Imperial influences, Simon Potter confirms that “substantial sections of the Conservative press greeted the reciprocity proposals with howls of protest, accusing the government of seeking economic and ultimately political union with the United States thereby betraying Canada’s imperial heritage.” To make matters worse for Laurier, the New York Times, according to Baker in A Case Study of Anti-Americanism in English Canada, reported that Champ Clark, a prominent Democrat and Speaker of the House of Representatives, claimed that free-trade was indeed the first step toward annexation with the U.S.

Ottawa Ont. Feb 15 – There was considerable interest and some irritation here today over Champ Clark’s speech in the House at Washington yesterday in which he said that the reciprocity agreement was the first step toward annexation. At the opening of today’s session of the House (of Commons), Col. Sam Hughes read a newspaper abstract of the speech and asked if it were a fair statement of intention.

Just like when the Boston newspaper editorial proclaimed the irrelevance of Queen Victoria to Canada during Laurier’s 1891 election, the U.S. media once again lit a fire of bias toward the U.S. when the Times published its article. In the midst of this fire storm, Champ further stated “I am for it [reciprocity] because I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions, clear to the North Pole.” Voters did not buy into Laurier’s assertion that the trade negotiated with the Americans was purely business, and in 1911 the Conservatives defeated the Liberal government. While many Canadian historians assert there were other reasons for Laurier’s defeat, such as a tired government, the 1911 election illustrated ‘the more things changed, the more they stayed the same’ when it came to the attitudes of many toward the U.S.

The anti-American bias evident in both the elections of 1891 and 1911 went largely dormant for the years leading up to the First World War till the end of the Second World War. Canada’s
experience defending the Empire proved costly and the political and popular opinion supported moves to distance, but yet remain associated with Great Britain. Canada, with a population of 7,879,000 people, contributed almost eight percent of its citizenry to the World War One effort in defense of the Empire. 39 Historians for Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) summarize the carnage: “For a nation of eight million people Canada's war effort was remarkable. A total of 619,636 men and women served in the Canadian forces in the First World War, and of these 66,655 gave their lives and another 172,950 were wounded. Nearly one of every ten Canadians who fought in the war did not return.” 40 VAC further records that through this war, Canada reached nationhood and earned the right for a separate signature on the Treaty of Versailles, given the gallantry demonstrated by the Canadian at the battles of Ypres, the Regina trench, the capture of Vimy Ridge, Passchendaele, and finally their entrance to Mons on November 1918.

After the war, Canadian views of its role in the Empire began to shift as many prominent politicians and a substantial segment of the population believed that ‘colonials’ served only as ‘cannon fodder’ for the defense of Great Britain in European wars. In 1925, Sir Clifford Sifton, the anti-free-trade adherent in the 1911 reciprocity debate, astonishingly asserted that Canada must agree and support the U.S. with respect to its involvement in the ‘The League of Nations.’ Hall in his writings on Sifton states:

Sir Clifford was no less vehement in denouncing the League of Nations and the international aggression committed by several of its leading members, including Greece, France, and Britain. The League was ‘a preposterous and expensive farce and amounts to nothing more than a part of a machine designed to involve us in European and Imperialistic complications’...Canada ought to follow the American lead, partly because they accurately perceived the risks of League membership and partly because Canada’s proper foreign policy ought to be ‘to avoid any trouble with the United States, and we have no business in the League when the United States is staying out. ‘Without the Americans, the League would be nothing more than an Agency for European countries to use in settling up their disputes, which we have absolutely nothing to do with.” 41
Sifton’s view of Canadian foreign policy reflected the feelings of many Canadians after the carnage of the First World War and was a distinct change in attitude toward the U.S., representing a new dimension in the national bias toward America. While Sifton argued extensively that Canada should follow the U.S., he also asserted that reciprocity would be the first step away from our heritage and voiced opposition to such an arrangement. Despite this emerging attitude in favor of U.S. isolationist foreign policy, Canada and other members of the Empire immediately declared war on Hitler subsequent to Britain’s declaration.

Britain, desperate to have the U.S. engaged in the Second World War, asked Canada to work closely with the U.K. government to lobby the Americans to support the Empire war effort. Essentially, the Canadian anti-American bias became the pro-American bias to save Great Britain. The British and Canadian government chose William Stephenson to both organize and carry out this mission. Stephenson’s closest friends were Bill Donavan (founder of the United States Office of Strategic Services) and Winston Churchill. Stephenson warned the Canadian prime minister that, without the U.S. in this war, the remaining free countries must feed resources to the Soviet Union, and Joseph Stalin could eventually emerge as the new world superpower, a dreadful possibility. British Prime Minister Churchill and the Canadian leadership knew they had to take “active steps” to convince the U.S. to join the Allies with the full force of American resources. Churchill created the Special Operations Executive (SOE), an international intelligence group for deception, disinformation, and sabotage activities against the Nazis. The Prime Minister gave instructions to Stephenson to establish an organization in the U.S. to conduct covert operations to realize three objectives: bring the U.S. into the war, drive the Nazis out of South America, and establish a training facility in Canada to train SOE agents and Americans called Camp X. The facility opened in 1941, but unofficially it was operational
earlier with the participation of Bill Donavon. Stephenson built the facility near Oshawa, a community fifty miles east of Toronto; close to the U.S. but far enough from the border to be unnoticed. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Canada’s new national radio company, purchased from U.S. radio interests large antennae that actually served as signal intelligence to intercept both German and Japanese traffic (known as Project Hydra). It formed part of Bletchley Park’s infrastructure. Hodgson, in Inside Camp X, summarizes the role of Hydra:

“Paramount among the objectives set out for the operation, including the training of Allied agents for the entire catalogue of espionage activities (sabotage, subversion, deception, intelligence, and other special means), was the necessity to establish a major communications link between North and South America and European operations of SOE. Code-named Hydra, it was the most powerful of its type.”

Stephenson indicated that Camp X trained approximately 2,000 people in the fine arts of deception and sabotage. Before the U.S. established Camp David, Camp X trained fifty-six Americans that included FBI and OSS operatives. The “OSS Camp X Historical Website” confirms: “Over the next ten months several hundred more OSS agents would travel to Canada where they would receive both basic and specialized training courses at Camp X...to form the backbone of the OSS/CIA wielding considerable influence over its wartime development and post war direction.”

As part of the espionage plan toward the U.S., Stephenson trained a selection of beautiful women he hired in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal who specialized in ‘personal services.’ The SOE arranged work for them in Washington and London, where they functioned as ‘secretaries’ and eventually private escorts. According to Stevenson, their objective was to acquire information on wealthy Nazi supporters and blackmail key politicians to ensure they
voted in favor of Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease and other key pieces of American legislation. Hodgson records that in October 1941, Stephenson provided to Roosevelt a fake map, supposedly stolen from German intelligence, which showed South America partitioned for Nazi control. The President, unaware of its lack of authenticity, revealed the document to the media. Stephenson arranged for his staff to work as “clerks” in Gallup polls, an innovation at that time for research into public attitudes. Hodgson reports Stephenson’s team distorted American polling statistics to demonstrate voter support for the war effort against Germany. The Canadians coordinated a comprehensive disinformation campaign throughout South America that included Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Chile, and Ecuador. They were effective. Congress approved Roosevelt’s requests to supply Britain with materiel before they entered the war in 1941. Canada organized on behalf of the Empire (soon the Commonwealth) covert activities in the U.S. to bring America fully into the twentieth century as a world superpower to combat Hitler and later the Soviet Union. The Canadian anti-American bias withered, albeit to save the British Empire.

Canadian biases toward the U.S. remained dormant for ten years subsequent to the end of the Second World War, largely due to involvement in the Korean War and the substantial economic growth in both countries. ‘It’s Back’ began in 1956, when Canada developed one of the most advanced jet fighter in the world, referred to as the Avro Arrow. According to former Avro scientists, the U.S. made it clear to Canada, through John Foster Dulles, that only the U.S. had the right to own such technology and that Canada should play a supporting role in U.S. defense technology developments. The former scientists reported: “It is now AIR TIGHT that they canned the Arrow due to the machinations of John Foster Dulles, Ike and others in JULY 1958!!.”\textsuperscript{46} Canadian aeronautics experts were unaware of U.S. developments on the U2 spy
plane and its successor the SR71 Blackbird, and American leaders did not want the USSR to have competing technology extracted by espionage from Canadian developments. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, yielded to U.S. pressure and cancelled the Arrow project and, supposedly at the insistence of the U.S., destroyed all the plans. He resented this decision for years and retaliated against the U.S. through Canadian support for Cuba and the Chinese Communist government on matters of trade.

In 1960-1961, Canadian-U.S. relations deteriorated significantly. The Kennedy Administration told Canada that it had to place U.S. nuclear missiles on Canadian soil and Diefenbaker refused. Martin, in his book concerning the Americanization of Canada notes:

Diefenbaker promoted Canadian independence with evangelical zeal... 'We are a power, not a puppet,' the Chief thundered during the controversy over the placement of U.S. nuclear warheads in Canada. 'His rampant nationalism alienated the entire ruling class: Bay Street, Wall Street, his civil service and politicians from all parties. [George] Grant credited the Chief with the strongest stance against satellite status ever attempted by a Canadian. This stance came at a high price.  

The following year, during the Cuban Missile Crises, the Conservatives first refused to cooperate with the U.S. in the blockade. The Conservative Foreign Minister pleaded the cabinet to reconsider “blindly following the U.S. lead, particularly since the President had not kept the commitment to consult Canada over the impending [missile] crisis. If we go along with the U.S. now, we’ll be their vassal forever.”

Canada had recognized Cuba as an independent state. President Kennedy demanded that Canada stop trading with Cuba, so the Prime Minister doubled the trade volumes instead. Prime Minister Diefenbaker then went even further. When China’s agricultural policies failed, resulting in near starvation for close to 30 million people, Canada executed the largest wheat sale ever to China. Newman reported that Kennedy advised the Prime Minister that he would blockade Canadian ships, an action that did not occur.
Nash reported that Kennedy remained furious over Canada’s support for Cuba and when the Conservatives called their election one year later, the CIA ran a disinformation campaign against Diefenbaker from inside the doors of the U.S. Embassy. Canada’s support for Cuba solidified when the public became aware of American interference. Many policymakers and the public ignored the real threat of Soviet interference and supported Cuba because it was the best way to antagonize Kennedy and the U.S. in general. The Kennedy Administration’s move to assist the Liberals in the defeat of the Conservatives ultimately backfired. Canadians voted in Pierre Elliot Trudeau, a left-leaning prime minister that was even more anti-American.

Trudeau’s policies built on Diefenbaker’s legacy. The Tory Prime Minister refused to join the U.S. in nuclear war training exercises (1959), he was the first white leader to seek banning South Africa from the Commonwealth (1961), he was the first prime minister to end discrimination against Asians and black immigrants (1960), he supported a total nuclear test ban against the wishes of the U.S. (1962), he was in opposition to joining the Organization of American States (1961), and he appointed women to his cabinet. Not only did Trudeau embrace Diefenbaker’s views, he became personal friends with Fidel Castro, in defiance against the U.S who sought a total ban on any cooperation with Cuba.

Trudeau’s action could have proved costly. In January 2008, Canadian news reported that the Kennedy and Nixon administrations authorized the CIA to assassinate Castro, and possibly Trudeau, with support from Mafia Chieftain Myron Lansky. According to Robert Wright:

Sensational stories about a dual-murder conspiracy against former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and Cuban President Fidel Castro have recently surfaced. The only Canadians not surprised by such reports appear to be the men and women who served as Trudeau's RCMP security detail...The idea that anti-Castro plotters might have wanted Trudeau and Castro dead is entirely plausible. The two were friends and "intellectual soulmates," as a Canadian ambassador to Cuba once put
it. Castro even served as an honourary pallbearer at Trudeau's state funeral in October 2000. Both were educated by Jesuits and trained in the law. Both were men of formidable intellect whose political idealism inspired millions of their compatriots, infuriated millions of others, and changed the course of their nations' histories.39

The Canadian anti-American bias accelerated considerably with the revelation that the CIA conducted covert medical experiments by force on Canadian citizens throughout the 1960s and possibly into the 1970s, at the prestigious Allen Institute located in Montreal. Doctor Cameron conducted covert LSD experiments relating to mind control. When a patient arrived for his or her for treatment, he used the legal medical powers of the Province of Quebec at the time to force patients into taking treatments. If they refused, he, through the law, would have them confined. One patient was the wife of a Canadian Member of Parliament. The MP was left of center, a standard British Labor Party derivative, not a Communist. According to the New York Times, David Orlikow, a retired member of Parliament, whose now-deceased wife, Velma, was another subject, said she emerged from the treatment “really a disabled person, not physically but emotionally.”50

The Times further reported that “the patients were put into a drugged sleep for weeks or months, subjected to electroshock therapy until they were ‘de-patterned,’ knowing neither who or where they were, and forced to listen to recorded messages broadcast from speakers on the wall or under their pillows.”51 It is worthy to note, that while Canadians placed the blame on the U.S. government, many ignored the possibility of Ottawa’s knowledge or participation.

Goreksy and Sigler, in their analysis of political polls conducted between 1960 and 1973 report that in 1963, 31 percent of Canadians believed that the state of relations with the U.S was improving, increasing to 38 percent by 1970. Conversely, during the same period, the percentage who believed relations worsened increased substantially from 5 percent to 26
percent. The authors found that a majority of Canadians supported some form of government regulation over U.S. foreign ownership, embraced a complex mixture of national consciousness combined with regional economic concerns, and expressed an increasing resentment of U.S. economic and cultural intrusions. However, their study did not identify ‘rampant ’anti-American attitudes. Nonetheless, reactions to the abovementioned events, including the Cameron experiments, do reveal a rise in anti-American bias. Moderate increases in positive attitudes towards the U.S. posted from these survey results (+38 percent) most likely compelled the post-Trudeau government to approach free-trade even though the anti-U.S. bias increased as well.

What happened to the ‘no evidence of rampant anti-American attitudes’ found in the above noted surveys? In 1988, the ‘spirit of 1891,’ confirmed by the election of 1911, and hardened somewhat during the 1960s and 1970s, returned with a vengeance. Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who defeated the Liberals in 1984, adopted Laurier’s reciprocity policy and completed negotiations with the Americans for comprehensive Canada/U.S. free-trade. The Liberals, who borrowed the historical Tory position, vowed to destroy that “sellout” in the Senate. When the writ was dropped for the election, “Canada proceeded to have one of its most lively federal elections in history, with the main election issue focused on the Free-trade Agreement itself.” The Conservatives won and the government approved the deal. However, within five years, the Conservatives had gone from the greatest majority victory in Canadian history to the worst electoral defeat in Canadian history. In 1993, the Liberals won a majority leaving the Conservatives with only two seats.
Reflections for the Twenty-First Century

The debate over the Mulroney-led Canada-U.S. Free-trade Agreement (FTA) became a furious and hostile event, equivalent to the conflicts during the Laurier-MacDonald election of 1891. Eventually, after the two countries signed the deal, the Canadian negative attitude fizzled, and both Canada and the US solidified the trade relationship. The agreement included definitions for subsidies that excluded government expenditures on defense, regional development policies and programs, Canadian Medicare, and cultural industries. Additionally, it contained a dispute resolution settlement where either country could file a trade complaint (i.e. Canadian lumber and American fishing claims). In the 1990s Canada and the U.S. expanded the original FTA to include Mexico, and the three parties renamed it as the ‘North American Free-trade Agreement’ (NAFTA).

The twenty-first century opened with the realization that terrorism is an international threat to national security. By 2004, Canadians had reflected on the events of September 11, 2001, and accept the real possibility that terrorist attacks could strike the homeland. Prior to this, in 1999, a fundamental shift occurred, with 71 percent of Canadians having a positive opinion of the U.S. By 2004 this number had declined substantially once again. Steve Maich summarizes results from surveys taken during that period: “In 1999, an Environics poll found 71 percent of Canadians held a favourable view of the United States. In 2003, a survey for the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that had fallen to 63 percent. And this year, the number was down to 59 percent. In late 2004, a poll by COMPAS for Global Television found 48 percent of respondents felt more "anti-American" lately, compared to just 23 percent who felt more "pro-American."”^54
However, Maich also found that U.S. and Canadian public opinion surveys yielded surprisingly consistent opinions in both countries on closer cooperation between the two countries on national security (65 percent Canada, 73 percent U.S.), border security (75 percent Canada, 81 percent U.S.), anti-terrorism (74 percent Canada, 81 percent U.S.), and coordinated energy policies (85 percent Canada, 89 percent U.S.). Seven years later, public opinion pollsters confirmed that Canadians retained their pro-defense cooperation views with the U.S. In covering a poll conducted in 2011 for Global News, Patrick Kane, a journalist for Global Edmonton reports: “One of the strongest majorities in the poll backed the North American security perimeter, with 70 percent agreeing that Canada harmonizing its security and border policies was ‘necessary and prudent’. Eighty-one percent of Albertans agreed, while agreement in Quebec was slightly higher than the national average, at 73 percent. Older Canadians and women were more likely to agree, and British Columbians less likely, at 60 percent.”

The above result is a remarkable reversal of Canadian bias, particularly in Quebec, Canada’s most left-leaning province. If anyone proposed a North American security zone prior to the events of September 11th, 2001, that political party would most likely have lost the election. With respect to women attitudes verses those of men, Cain reports, “Women, interestingly, gave more hawkish responses than men throughout the poll, generally being more in favour of vigilance, the use of force overseas and co-operation with the U.S.” For the last forty-five years, Canadian women were far more anti-American than men and they tended to hold stronger views leaning to the left falling victim to the traditional Canadian bias.

Additionally, twenty-six years ago a substantial segment of the Canadian population strongly opposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), originally envisioned by President Ronald Reagan. The U.S. gave birth to SDI in the center stage of Canada’s controversy over
free-trade. Both issues became psychologically entangled with myths and latent fears generated by that debate. Every prime minister since 1984 opposed Canada’s involvement in this defense initiative except for Prime Minister Jean Chretien, who adopted a more moderate position. In 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin publically signaled to the U.S. that Canada was ready to discuss many irritants between the two nations. Lee Carter of the BBC news summed up the President’s visit to Canada as “Bush patches up Canada’s relations,” noting “Mr. Bush made a brief mention of talks on Canada's further co-operation in America's controversial missile defense programme, but the full details of those talks are not known. Public opinion is deeply opposed to Canadian involvement, but Canada is also a key player in Norad, a common North American defense alliance.”

The current Conservative Government, with support from a majority of Canadians, has moved beyond historical fears, and in 2011, the Harper Conservative Government successfully negotiated a comprehensive, continental-wide agreement covering trade and security with the U.S. referred to as “Beyond the Border,” an impossible occurrence twenty-five years ago.

Today there is a prominent national issue that meets the conditions for a Canadian cognitive bias reaction rooted in subconscious longevity that at some point may manifest itself in silence and explode either in open controversy or through negative voter reactions. Symbolically, water is Canada’s “Area 51.” There are organizations that try to mobilize Canadian subconscious biases through provision of facts (most out of context), and ‘evidence’ from supposed ‘witnesses’ that link water to broad-based conspiracy theories traced to the Mulroney’s trade deal. Apparently an advisor to the original trade negotiations found documents that contained plans for a ‘grand canal’ that would move water to the U.S. from Canada’s north. Chief of Quebec Cree, Matthew Coon-Come, who is head of the “Canadian Institute of Political
Integrity,” reports on his website “The biggest scam ever to be pulled on the entire world is Free-trade and I'll tell you why. Simon Reisman (Canada’s trade negotiator) had a difficult job. He was the director of a project called the Grand Canal, which is to be built from James Bay."57

This source feels similar to MacDonald’s fear tactics over free-trade in 1891. The authors’ of the above quote are well aware of Canada’s inherent biases and seek to feed it with a conspiracy view. However, on water diversion, it is highly probable that U.S. northern states and environmentalists would combine forces with Canada to oppose such plans. Loretta Griffin wrote in the Earth Island Journal, that a U.S.-Canada-Mexico group, “The North America Water and Power Alliance,” proposed that governments should build a massive water diversion project that would supply NAFTA partners will water and electrical power. Griffin summarized the plan:

This massive system of record-high dams, water diversions, mammoth reservoirs and huge aqueducts could make Libya's "Great Man-Made River" water pipeline look like a drop in the bucket. Under this little-known, 30-year-old plan, Canadian and Alaskan rivers would be diverted to the water-starved American Southwest and Mexico. The full NAWAPA plan calls for the creation of 240 dams and reservoirs, 112 water diversions and 17 aqueducts and canals capable of moving as much as 136 cubic kilometers (85 cubic miles) of water from Alaska to the Rio Grande River each year. Some 80 percent of the water would be diverted to the US. Of that, 19 percent would be released to flow into Mexico.58

Eight years later, Anthony Wilson-Smith reported in his article for the Maclean’s Magazine, “A Fight Reborn,” that water was on the trade agenda. The Government of British Columbia passed a bill in the Provincial Legislature banning the bulk export of water to the U.S. A California company proceeded to file a complaint to the NAFTA dispute resolution panel demanding penalty payments for this government intervention. According to the author, “Alarm bells began sounding in Ottawa…and before that challenge, the federal Liberals thought they had banned such exports by specifically citing one exception – bottled water.”59
rekindled the free-trade debate and ignited the bias again and could have been a factor in the decline in the number of Canadians that had positive views of the U.S. Today water is not on the radar of politicians, media, nor the population. It is dormant for now, but probably not for long.

There is a uniquely Canadian characteristic that displayed itself in the election of 1891. As described earlier, while the free-trade debate raged between MacDonald and Laurier, neither politicians nor the public dared mention the French-English divide over language, religion, and culture represented by the Manitoba School Question. There was no appetite among Protestants for publically funded Catholic schools. Everyone was quiet. In 1896, Laurier defeated MacDonald’s Conservatives over the Manitoba school issue and then brokered a solution – French where numbers warranted, a policy that brought temporary peace between English and French Canada. Over a century later, this issue again reared its head in Ontario elections of 2007 and 2011, with the controversy focused upon Islamic schooling.

The provincial Conservatives “snatched defeat from the jaws of victory,” over the issue of Muslim religious/education activities. The Conservatives lost support when they spoke in favor of public funding for private schools, and when the Conservative leader refused to take a stand on Muslim religious ceremonies in public schools. In the election of 2007, the polls reported that the Conservatives, a slightly right of center party, led the race by ten points. There were no ‘burning issues’ but people wanted change from the Liberals. Several weeks before voting, John Tory, the Conservative leader, announced his government would fund faith-based private schools. Immediately Conservative support plummeted, and the Liberals won a majority.

According to Jeoffery Stevens, reporter for the *The Guelph Mercury*:

Religion and education have been a combustible combination throughout Ontario history. The combustion is reinforced this time by a nasty undercurrent of racism – or Islamophobia, as it is being called in the press. Pollsters have noted that the level of support for faith-based funding drops
precipitously when the word “Muslim” is included in the question. They say it is as though the question conjures up visions in some minds of bomb-building being taught in Ontario schools.\textsuperscript{60}

One year earlier, Canadians learned that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) averted terror attacks potentially three times more devastating than the attacks in Oklahoma City. Eighteen Muslim youth, driven by the radical Islam, trained in Canada’s northern wilderness to bomb Parliament Hill and other targets. In 2011, the provincial Liberals, who held a majority government they gained from the 2007 year fiasco, called an election for October. The Laurier Institute of Public Opinion and Policy reported on July 19, 2011 that the recent IPSOS poll for Ontario posted on July 14 providing a Conservative lead of 11 percent presents a provincial projection of Conservatives 63 seats, Liberal 25 seats, New Democratic Party -19 seats. Again, the Conservatives could taste victory. Several weeks before the election, the press queried all leaders about Islamic prayers in public schools. Mr. Hudak, who in 2007 replaced the ill-fated John Tory, failed to provide a definitive response on how his party would address the issue. Atoinella Artusa a writer for the Toronto Sun newspaper reported:

They know the cultures of their schools,” Hudak said. “(I’ll leave) school boards and principals to make these types of decisions on what’s appropriate ... I think that’s the way you approach this.” A decision to allow Islamic prayer sessions every Friday in the cafeteria at Valley Park Middle School, on Overlea Blvd. in Toronto, continues to draw objections. Local imams lead a 40-minute service — non-Muslims are banned from the cafeteria during that time — to prevent about 400 students from leaving the school in the middle of the day to go to prayers.\textsuperscript{61}

The liberals were even less committal and this angered many voters. However, the leader of Ontario’s socialist party was very clear. According to Artusa, the leader of the NPP asserted that children should have a quiet place to go to pray if needed, but full religious services do not belong in a public school. The Conservatives lost the election, but did gain some seats, while the socialist party received the largest increase in seats.
A key element behind voter fear was the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S. In response to this horrific event, most Canadians immediately went silent, leaving a cold impression to many Americans. However, the reality was very different. Canadians cared deeply and demonstrated these feelings by the overwhelming generosity shown to U.S. citizens who were stranded when overseas flights were rerouted to Canada. President Bush publicly acknowledged and thanked Canadians for this show of love and respect. Sixteen years later, two biases intersected in the Ontario electorate; dislike for private schools (rooted in 1891) and cultural fear focused on terrorism (rooted in 2001).

The press and politicians publicly referred to the first bias (preference for public schools), but few politicians and few in the media presented limited or no discussion on this second factor, fear of Islam. Some specialists postulated that Canadians do know that racial stereotyping is both wrong and it violates the desires of many to be politically correct, and therefore the solution is to ‘clam-up.’ The reality is that many Islamic Canadians are abhorrent to radicalism and have proven to be excellent citizens, completely contrary to populist fear. The Islamic communities work very hard to both become Canadians and provide support to the RCMP and intelligence agencies in the war on terrorism.

Another example of ‘clam up’ occurred in the national federal election of 2006 and 2011, when Canada was deep into combat action in Afghanistan. The socialist party (New Democrats), and the Quebec separatist party, said nothing about Afghanistan while both the Liberals and Conservatives chose to debate domestic issues. Katie Hyslop, writer for a regional paper on Canada’s west coast wrote, “With the exception of a brief mention of the war in Afghanistan by New Democratic Party leader Jack Layton during the English debate, the closest any party leader has come to discussing either battle is to squabble over the cost of 65 F-35-
fighter jets. But critics say the leaders haven't forgotten – they're just hoping the Canadian public has.\textsuperscript{62}

Voter silence over Afghanistan has its roots in the national psychological trauma from the First World War. Canada’s contribution was so costly, it created in Canadians a deep respect for our military, and as a result, many citizens refuse to engage in any public disagreement or conflict that could damage the honor and sacrifice made by Canada’s soldiers, even if many disagree with the cause. Essentially, Canadians are reverent about their patriotism. The Ontario elections over education and Afghanistan illustrate this unique ‘clam-up’ characteristic. The issue for policymakers is how to know when the population grows silent and what issue generates this reaction. Failure to comprehend this characteristic can be catastrophic and affect implementation of needed change in society. This is particularly relevant to the Canadian anti-American bias, where polls indicate moderate views and support while underneath there may be a strong different view, such as what happened in the 1988 Canada-U.S. free-trade discussion.

Conclusion

Are Canadians anti-American? The answer seems obvious enough. Of course we are. Historians like me are steeped in the glib patriotisms of the anti free-trade campaigns of 1891, 1911 and 1988, or in John Diefenbaker’s “It’s me against the Americans” tirades in the 1960s. J. L. Granatstein calls anti-Americanism Canada’s state religion. Frank Underhill, a major historian of an earlier generation, characterized Canadians as the ideal anti-Americans, the perfect anti-Americans, the anti-Americans as they exist in the mind of God. He mused that Americans are benevolently ignorant of Canada, while Canadians are malevolently knowledgeable about the United States.\textsuperscript{63}

This research moves from defining the source of Canadian attitudes toward the U.S., which essentially reflects the founding principles of Canadian democracy (peace, order, and good government’ versus the American focus on individuality) through three periods of intense dislike over 120 years. The study finds that Canada’s attitude toward the U.S. is not an anti-
American display but rather a bias that at times becomes nasty, but never permanently damages Canada’s relationship with the U.S. Hilmer’s above quote summarizes the high points of Canada’s negative expressions toward the U.S., but there have also been low bias periods that involved extensive cooperation; after WWI, during WWII, the late 1990s, and cooperation with the U.S. on North American security. History reveals that Canadians tend to be more pro-American during periods of economic prosperity and in times of world crises.

However, during the 1960s the government halted Canada’s security forces from participating in nuclear training exercises and almost prevented the military from assisting the U.S. during the Cuban missile crises. Canada’s friendship with Cuba strained the nation’s diplomatic and military relationships by creating an environment of distrust with the allies during the Cold War. During the 1970s the federal government reduced substantially expenditures on the Canadian Forces. In the 1980s Canadian protests over the testing of cruise missiles on domestic soil created additional complications in relations with America and the Canadian bias slowed (if not halted) Canada’s participation with the U.S. in strategic defense initiatives.

Spending on national security and defense is a precarious issue with the Canadian public; today’s support could ‘morph’ into tomorrow’s conflict. Therefore Canada’s policymakers must take the pulse of the population so they can take steps to mitigate possible risks of ‘blow-back’ on their proposed policies and programs. Analysts could examine segments of the Canadian population using focus groups and well-designed attitudinal surveys (market research) to identify reactions to issues and emerging trends. This testing would provide policymakers with insights into delicate subjects where Canadians tend to surprise both
policymakers and pollsters with reactions hidden under this psychological veil referred to as the ‘clam-up.’

At stake is long-term planning and budgeting the Canadian Forces requires to modernize the military to ensure Canada meets its commitments to its allies and have future resources to defend the nation. If for example, Canadians have a ‘hidden fear’ over activities in the north, this emotion could reveal itself in bias against the Americans, lend support to the more extreme environmentalist views, and consequently result in public pressure to reduce needed budgets for the defense of Canada’s northern region. The U.S. needs Canada to play its part in the north for the security and defense of North American. Currently Canada, and indeed the U.S. may be vulnerable to Russian and Chinese activities in the north which Canadians view as their territory.

Therefore the hypothesis is affirmative. History demonstrates that Canada-U.S. relations are influenced by a national cognitive bias against the U.S. that has created difficulties and pose future challenges for policymakers who must make choices for the betterment of North American national security. The federal election of 1891 does reflect the truism ‘with change comes the status quo’ and that bias is sufficiently significant to warrant special attention by policymakers.

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